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 The world go ahead, and technology with him. A few years ago, nobody hear about 
device like Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, which is able to immerse and precede its task 
without help from people side. Engineers have conducted a lot of researches but only 
at universities and military units. The ordinary people were not interested about these devices 
at all. Times have changed. Nowadays, via the internet anyone can buy a water drone for their 
fun and use it in nearby lake or swimming pool. UUVs are very interesting devices; thanks 
of them scientists are able to perform many important and interesting surveys. They facilitate 
and accelerate the work of people, especially in difficult area of operation like deep seas. 
 The topic about the risk analysis of small semi-submersible object is very interesting 
because of two main aspects. The first reason is the rapid development of these devices. Forty 
years ago, nobody has heard about unmanned underwater vehicles and nowadays, they have 
started to substituting peoples in their works. These devices have become commonly used 
in bottom researching for oil and gas industry. They have been saving a lot of money and time 
for companies. They are very inquisitive because they are technologically advanced, but they 
have still a lot of things to improve. It is curious and requiring issue especially for marine 
engineers. 
 The second reason is interesting question of risk assessment. It can be found 
a lot of information about the risk in work, but really hardly anyone heard something about 
the risk assessment of object or device. The definitions like financial risk or credit risk are very 
good known, but few of us heard about the risk of the system. The risk analysis is quit new 
branch of science in the engineering, which is still developing. Often the engineers analyze 
a failure rate or a reliability of the system, forgetting that is only a narrow section of risk analysis.  
 This thesis consists of six main chapters. In the first chapter of this thesis, it will 
be presented the basis information about unmanned underwater vehicles. It will show 
the application of these devices and fields in which they are used. One of the most important 
aspects is short history of this system, which let to see and understand how fast these devices 
have been developing over the years. It is also essential to mention about the aspects, which 
need to be improve, which are not perfect yet. The chapter will be finished by short summarizing 
of the base of risk analysis of UUV‘s, why this task is performed and why it is so important 
especially for this equipment. 
 Subsequently chapter will discuss the model of risk, in this case UUV Seaglider from 
Kongsberg Company. To perform a good risk analysis, initially it is obligatory to have a defined 
object, which will be analyzed and is called risk model. Before analysis, it is essential to know 
parameters of object like length, beam, equipment in which is fitted or boundaries of device, like 
area of operation. The technical specification of this device will be present. Nowadays 




of gliders. The external appearance of the devices no is significantly different, but they 
can be fitted with different sensors, which cause theirs various applications. 
 The following part of the work, will present the main risk analysis methods which are 
used specially in engineering. The basics information about methods, ways of counting 
the probability, and fields in which these methods are commonly used will be discussed. 
Nowadays many different methods of risk analysis were involved, which are used in different 
branch to obtain intended results. No all methods are appropriate to obtain specific results, 
especially in engineering. The methods like Fault Tree Analysis, Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
or Brainstorming will be presented, which later will be used to perform the risk assessment. 
It will allow to knowing better and understanding these methods and seeing, which 
of them are suited to achieve a specified goal. 
The most important in this thesis will be calculations and assessment of the risk. 
Different aspects and methods have been selected, which are the most essential in the view 
of risk analysis. The risk will be assessed in view of navigation system, difficult area of operation 
and moving system. These aspects are the most significant for devices like Seagliders. 
Navigation and communication is used to obtain UUVs position by different equipment‘s, which 
are installed on devices and to send the commands to the vehicle. The moving system 
is essential issue for device‘s move. UUV‘s are used specially in region where people cannot 
go, so very often they are used in difficult area of operation, where they can meet others objects 
(vessels, wracks, rocks) , weather condition are difficult (high wave, strong tidal or current) 
or the sea is very deep. For each of these aspects, other method of risk analysis has been 
selected.  
The next chapter will be the continuation of the analysis and will discuss the results, 
which will be obtained. The correctness of results and selected methods will be accessed. 
Using the literature of this subject, based on the works performed by engineers from this 
branch, it is possible to check the results and the accuracy of the methods. The amendments 
and the errors of methods will be proposed. Worthy of mention is the issue connected 
with acceptability of the risk. Thank of this issue, the risk can be analyzed in the view 
of its permissibility. It is helpful to indicate the weak aspects of vehicle, which can be corrected 
latter or paid attention on them. It may happen that for some reasons, object cannot be used 
in industry because of the high risk associated with the system. The thesis will be finished 
by brief summarizing of the performed work. The methods which are the most suitable for risk 
assessment of Seaglider will be noted. 
The risk analysis is very important issue and the contemporaries engineers cannot 
forget about that. The earlier development of hazards posed on the system, will help to protect 
against them and save a lot of many for companies, protect the human health 
and the environment. The prior analysis of the system will allow concentrating on the weakest 
points of the device and preparing a plan of action in the case of hazard. This is particularly 




and still need to be improved. They move and work in dangerous and unstable environment 
and thereby they are exposed to big danger. These are expensive devices and the owner 







1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF UNMANNED UNDERWATER VEHICLES   
1.1. Basic information about UUVs 
The UUV is an unmanned underwater vehicle similar to unmanned robot, which travels 
akin to the Curiosity Rover which is used by NASA on Mars, but it is travel underwater. They 
are known as underwater drones. They are able to perform the work without the human 
occupant. These devices can be divided into three main categories. First group are device 
called ROV- Remotely Operated Vehicle. They are supple in power and communication through 
tether and they are under control by remote operator. The second class is AUV- Autonomous 
Underwater Vehicles, which contain its own power and controlling itself [4].  The third groups 
are gliders, which are smaller and buoyancy-driven vehicles. 
Many different technologies are needed for UUV‘s systems. For many years, these 
aspects have been improved, but some of them still have some problems to solve. To these 
issues belong: navigation, communication, energy and sensors [4]. First devices to control 
position had been using the dead reckoning. This method has a lot of errors, for example 
because is very difficult to take into account effect of winds, currents or tides. In the other side, 
acoustic transponder navigation systems have a greater accuracy but the cost of is significantly 
higher. Scientists try to improve accuracy and precision of navigation systems. In the past 
years, UUV have started to use the GPS on board. When the vehicles are on the surface, they 
are able to update internal system‘s information, but it is difficult to do it under the water. 
Nowadays it is still in interest of engineers to navigate relative to the environment in which 
the system exists [4]. 
The underwater acoustic communication is the most viable system of communication 
available for the system design [4]. In the past 10 years it could be noted the significant 
development of this type of communication. Nowadays some specialists try to involve laser 
communication which has relatively noise free communication. The ROVs to communication 
use normally a long tether cables, but nowadays the engineers from US WHOI developed 
a wireless underwater communication , to control the ROV in real-time. Thanks of this method, 
they eliminate the long tether cables and obtain better degree of freedom of underwater drone 
[43]. Other problem is to connect multiple vehicles which perform common task in the same 
time. A lot of effort is implementing to set an efficient network among underwater systems. 
The durability of UUVs is varies from a few hours of work or days, but they can be found 
the systems which can perform mission of months or even the years. The durability varies 
because of different sensing capability and limited transit speed. The majority of systems have 
the lead acid batteries; next big group includes silver zinc batteries o lithium primary batteries. 
Nowadays in many UUVs started to use NiMH batteries [27]. Also it is important to mention 
about solar energy, which nowadays is used to power the UUVs. These systems required 




it has to be emerged while is recharging the batteries. On the figure 1.1 is presented a basic 
design of this system. 
Fig.1.1. UUV with solar panels (Source: http://ausi.org/research/sauv/) 
The UUVs are designed to perform specified issues and thereby they have 
a lot of different sensors in their platform to obtain data from the ocean environment. First 
devices have been created to perform basic operation. Together with the development 
of technology, more sensors were added to the system, to obtain more specified and accuracy 
data. A lot of effort have been put to integrate sensors and some unique constrains 
of the UUVs. Newly it has been ascertained that the development of the new sensors has 
to be based on the restrictions imposed by the vehicles. It has been caused the development 
of special sensors, especially for this group of vehicles: lower power, smaller, smarter 
and highly reliable. A lot of emphasis nowadays is putted on development optical and acoustic 
systems to obtain higher resolution images over longer ranges [4]. 
The huge numbers of vehicles have been designed in the range from approximately 
50 kg to 900 kg of weight, but majority of them are these smallest one [3]. The operation speed 
is in the range from 0.5 
 
 
 to 5 
 
 




Due to the depth rating, the UUVs can be divided into three main groups: vehicles designed 
to depth of 50 meters (surface layer), vehicles for depth of 300 meters (interior layer) 
and to depth of 6000 meters (bottom layer). These first one, are mainly used on shallow water 
or coastal water, and the third one are mainly utilized in deep-surveyors in the oil and gas 
industry. 
The main task which performs these devices is the bottom mapping and the observation 
of water columns [3]. They are able to do that, thanks to special equipment, for example: 
mechanically scanned sonar, laser-linescan imaging system, subbottom profilers‘ o side-scan 
sonar. They are able to measure parameters like: salinity, pH, optical backscatter, oxygen, 
temperature, chlorophyll fluorescence or inherent optical properties [3]. On the figure 1.2 





Fig.1.2. UUV‘s application and characteristics (Source: [49]) 
The deep-water survey is important application of UUVs, mainly because of economic 
reasons. For example in operation below 1000 meters, the tether dominates as a towed system; 
firmly reduce the speed and the maneuverability. In the opposed to this, UUV‘s survey 
at the depth 3000 meters has the speed two to four times greater. It should be also mentioned, 
that the process of turning of the system to pass across a survey area is eliminated, 
if we compare it to a vessel which has to turn with a towed system, which take several hours 
and much more kilometers and in this time, system is completely unproductive [3]. 
The companies, which employee the UUV‘s to bottom surveys, can also save 
a lot of money, because this equipment reduce numbers of ships required for a survey. 
In the normal cases, when the deep tow is performed, the company needs to employ two 
vessels, one for towing and second one to determining the position of the body which is towed. 
This second ship is obligatory, because they are cases when the towed body is several 
kilometers behind the tug (towing ship). To determine position, it is used acoustic tracking 
system and thereby, which cannot be effectively used by tug. This second ship is used 
to maintain station above towed-body. Additionally in one area of operation, many UUVs 





1.2. Application and history of UUVs 
Recently UUVs started to be accepted for task concerning: commercial, military 
missions o oceanographic issues. The market is divided into three main areas: science 
(especially research agencies and universities), commercial (oil and gas industry) and military 
use (battle space preparation). Nowadays, they can be met also other areas, where UUVs 
found their destiny, namely as a hobby and a use in illegal way. 
These devices are very attractive for researches like: the bottom or the underwater 
parts of vessels research. The main attribute is that they can reach shallow water in contrast 
to boats, and some of them deeper water than divers. They have been using by scientists 
to create maps of the ocean bottom, to identify hazards, to ascertain the wracks, to study lakes, 
to record environmental information and to explore geologic formations. The UUVs are able 
to measure the concentration of various components or elements, the presence of microscopic 
life or absorption of reflection of the light. One of the interesting features is also that, this device 
can be configured as tow-vehicle and can deliver sensor packages to defined position. 
In the industry, the UUVs are also used especially in oil and gas industry to make 
detailed maps of the sea bottom, before the start of building infrastructure like pipelines. 
After a survey, a base can be installed with minimum effect to environment and maximum cost 
effective manner.  
These vehicles are also used by people as a kind of toy. Nowadays it can be seen 
a huge growth of technology for example: drones or very advanced telephones. Engineers start 
to create underwater unmanned vehicles for normal people as a kind of joy. As an example, 
it can be cited a Ziphius which is a first app-controlled aquatic drone. It is a small device, which 
can reach speed 5.4 of knots. It is fitted in skilled HD camera with the LED enhances 
and in extra sensor which allow to controlling it by smartphone or tablet. This technological 
advanced vehicle can be bought in internet
1
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 On the other hand, the growth of the technology caused the increase 
of the use of technology in the illegal way. The sea drones are very interesting for drug dillers 
and smugglers. It is very easy way to transport a prohibited cargo to the other county. 
In the case if police find a drone with illegal load, it is very difficult to find a guilty, especially 
when everybody can buy a drone even on the internet. Where there is a crime, they have 
to be expected a police and army. Unmanned underwater vehicles are also used by army. 
These vehicles have a lot of different missions like: information operations, inspections, mine 
countermeasures or communication in battle field. 
 The UUVs have the applications in many different fields. Together with the development 
of technology, it can be observed a development of these devices, which a few years ago were 
only in the science fiction movies. The first vehicles were developed at the University 








of Washington at the Applied Physics Laboratory in 1975 by Stan Murphy, Bob Francois 
and Terry Ewart. The SPURV which mean a Special Purpose Underwater Research Vehicle, 
at the beginning was used to study diffusion, submarine wrecks and acoustic transmission [37]. 
One of the first underwater unmanned vehicles was founded by ONR. The United States Office 
of Naval Research (ONR) funded the researches and development of these vehicles, which 
became the US Navy‘s first unmanned underwater vehicles. Until 1979 the navy had been using 
a total of seven SPURVs [52]. One of the first, was able to dive up to 10 000 feet and operate 
4 hours [37].  
 In 1985, the remotely operated vehicle Argo has found the wrack of the Titanic and four 
years letter a World War II battleship Bismarck [37]. In the 1990‘s after two United States Navy 
ship badly damage by Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, the Navy initiated a program 
to create UUV to put the mines without notice from enemy side [37]. In 1994 the main objective 
of UUV program was to improve the systems to avoid the detection and dedicated 
minesweepers on sea surface. In 1996 was developed Near-Term Mine Reconnaissance 
System (NMRS) by Northrop Grumman, which was a two-vehicle platform to be launched from 
tube of submarine and was connected to the vessel by tether. Letter the NMRS was replaced by 
LMRS- Long Term Mine Reconnaissance System [37].  
 The REMUS- Remote Environmental Monitoring Units are the most prolific family 
of UUV [37]. The commercially available vehicles include different designs 
as the REMUS 100AUV which is small and developed by Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution and produced by Hydroid Ins [52]. REMUS has been used to clear sea mines around 
the port of Umm Qasr. In this case, the UUV first time have been working in combat 
environment.  
The hundreds of different UUVs have been designed, but only a few companies were 
managed to sell vehicles in significant amount. It was a time for experimentations, to define 
the potential of these vehicles. To big companies we can include Kongsberg Maritime, Bluefin 
Robotics, Teledyne Gavia and International Submarine Engineering Ltd [52]. Nowadays 
the market and designers want to follow commercial requirements. The future projects will 
include hover-capable UUVs, light-intervention and hybrid UUV design. 
It has to be remembered, that the market is driven by financial requirements and new designs 
will save a lot of money and expensive ship time. 
 In the 2008, new class of UUVs were developed, which design can be found 
in the nature. They are called biomimetic or bionic vehicles, which are able to achieve better 
degree of efficiency in maneuverability and propulsion, thanks to copy of successful designs 
from the nature. The example can be a Festo‘s AquaJelly and Evologics‘ Bionic Manta
2
. 
The first vehicle is presented on the figure 1.3.  







Fig.1.3. Festo‘s AquaJelly (Source: https://www.festo.com/group/en/cms/10227.htm) 
1.3. UUV and risk assessment 
All technologies, and ocean engineering is changing over the years. 
It has to be remembered, that in this branch of technology engineers are cooperating 
with the risk. Looking for a new technology like unmanned underwater vehicles engineers can 
expect that the risk assessment take on a slightly different dimension than this applied 
for conventional ships. To ensure reliability of UUV‘s engineers must to evaluate a new method 
or change a little older to perform a good risk analysis. 
Engineers have to work with vehicles which are able to submerge and proceed their 
work without a help from direct people side. They have to deal with the dangers of submerged 
units, which are on the large depth and on the large distance from the operator. The operator 
is obligated to operate according to procedures, which ensure a safety of the vehicle but also 
a safety for people on the vessel or around of the equipment [51]. For designers, this device 
should be design in view of many varied perspective of risk, remembering about insurance 
companies, lawyers and regulators. Other requirements must be prepared for these devices 
than for ships. 
At the beginning, unmanned underwater vehicles started operate 
but only as experimental vehicles, especially in area of military operations, but thanks to growth 
of technology, industrial companies are allowed to work with them. Thanks to latest 
miniaturizations and technical advances many of companies could afford to use UUVs. 
According to Manley J.E. [19], one of the reason of slow growth of using of these vehicles, 
is operational risks. Engineers have been trying to approach to the problem of risk assessment. 
The most critical phases of operations are launching and recovering of device. This assumption 
is true but especially for deep ocean vehicles, because they are operating in quite calm 
environment. Regarding to vehicles which are used in shallow water, near the shore, the most 




Coastal waters are the most dangerous for UUVs because of potential risks of man-
made structures, human activity or environmental hazards [24]. It has to be remembered, 
that such episodes occur with relatively high frequency and can be presented at the same time. 
To achieve a high survival probability, it is necessary a risk mitigation strategy. The community 
over the years has addressed risk by practical implementation like design as simple as possible, 
the reference mission as unpretentious as possible and the supervision as accurate as possible 
[5].  
In recent years, there have been several of vehicle losses, for example Autosub2 
and the Autonomous Benthic Explorer- ABE [5]. The first case is the most high-profile loss, 
which had the place on 16 February 2005 under the Fimbulisen ice-shelf. In that case, a formal 
inquiry ascertained, that the loss of power or abort command could cause the vehicle loss. 
Second accident is more recently, the loss of ABE in March 2010, which had place during 
the exploring the Chile Triple Junction [41]. It was the first underwater vehicle of this kind. 
It was designed at the WHOI- Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in 1990‘s [41]. There 
was no formal inquiry about loss of the ABE. The operation team and the designer ascertained, 
that the vehicle suffered an implosion of a glass sphere, which was used for providing 
buoyancy, which caused a quick destruction of on-board systems [5].  
The risk analysis of UUVs has to be estimated during the design and the development 
[5]. It has to be remembered, that the likelihood of event depends on several different factors, 
such as vehicle‘s internal reliability, the operational environment, the experience 
and the competence of the design team, the quality of the maintenance program etc. It should 
be noted that different stakeholder has different interest in the risk. The scientist is interested 
in recover of data gotten by vehicles or in his availability at a given time. On the other hand, 
the owner of the underwater vehicles is more interested in the safe recovery it from the water 
[5]. The highest risk is the loss of vehicle, but the process of risk management can be applied 
for other risk like loss of data or failure of equipment. The UUV risk management process was 
developed specially to support decision making. 
In recent years, a lot of approaches have been made to quantify the ongoing risk 
of vehicles which operate in different scenarios [24]. The surveyors provide probability 
of survival in most challenging setups (coastal waters) between 0.97 and 0.99 for mission 
ranges below 30 km [24]. Coastal water is the most demanding scenario for vehicles, because 
the potential risks are numerous, for example: environmental hazards, man-made structures, 
human activity etc. The frequency of such episodes is high and they can be occurred 
at the same time [12]. To achieve high survival probability, the risk mitigation and acceptability 




2. RISK MODEL AND TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE VEHICLE 
2.1. Technical description of UUV Seaglider  
 To perform a good risk assessment, it is obligatory to define a system, 
which will be analyzed. Based on the objectives of the risk model, the system boundaries 
are formed. In the development of the system definition, it is assisted the establishment 
of the boundaries. The goal of the analysis defines the items included in external boundary 
region. This is important step in system modeling due to exacted analysis will depend 
on the system boundaries which were defined [11]. 
The Kongsberg is company from Norway which delivers systems for: marine 
automation, dynamic positioning, subsea survey and construction and satellite positioning [38]. 
Seaglider is one of the UUVs sold by company Kongsberg. In the table 2.1 is presented 
the technical description of Seaglider. 
Table 2.1. Technical description of vehicle Seaglider 
Weight and dimensions 
Vehicle main body length 1,8m-2m long  
Vehicle maximum diameter 30cm 
Weight (dry) 52 kg 
Wing spam 1m 
Antenna mast length 0.43-1m 
Dive statistics 
Maximum travel range/ dive cycles 4600 km (approximately 650 dives to 1 km depth) 
Operating depth range 50m- 1000m 
Speed 0,4 to 0,6 kt 
Variable Buoyancy Volume 850 cc 
Glide angle 16-45  1:3,5 to 1:1 slope  
Battery                                                     
Battery type Lithium Sulfuryl Chloride primary battery packs, 18 MJ 
Battery life Up to 10 months 
Optional battery 
Battery type Lithium ion rechargeable battery packs 
Battery life Up to 2 months 
Electrical features Mechanical features 
Ultra-low power microprocessor Isopycnal pressure hull 
High capacity compact FLASH memory No external moving parts 
4 open serial channels for sensors Low drag fiberglass composite fairing 
Telemetry :Iridium Satellite link 
Guidance and control 
Dead reckoning between surface GPS fixes using a 3-axis digital compass 
Kalman filter prediction for mean and oscillatory currents 
Bathymetry map system and acoustic altimeter for near bottom dives 
(Source: [38]) 
The navigation is performed by combination of GPS when the vehicle is on the sea 
surface and of internal sensors which monitor the vehicle depth, attitude and heading during 
the dives. The biggest advantages of this equipment are low cost of it, versatile payload 
capability and long deployment capacity. Thanks to satellite communication, the Seaglider 
can obtain most of the data in near real-time [38]. Its model and robust design allow performing 




oceanographic and marine information around the word. It uses a wings and small changes 
in buoyancy to achieve forward motion. This method is extremely efficient and causes 
the longest endurance of the system. Other devices from this company are using an electrically 
driven propeller [38]. Glider has to surface periodically to obtain its position, receive commands 
via satellite telemetry and transmit collected data. 
The vehicle has an interior aluminium hull which resists pressure and a complex hull 
with flooded fiberglass fairing, ensures a streamlined laminar-flow shape [25]. Seaglider 
streamlined shape provides higher drag at low speeds as well lower for higher speed [25]. 
The pressure hull is milled into fluted pattern which provide appropriate compressibility 
to that of seawater, so buoyant diving force remains when the vehicle change depths [9]. 
Thanks of that, the vehicle saves a lot of energy especially at large operating depths [25]. 
The hull is consisted of series of supported (by ring stiffeners) deflecting arched panels. 
Compared with conventional hull, the compressible hull allow to saving pumping well 
over          at the sea bottom of 1 km dive [9]. 
2.2. Safety features of UUV Seaglider 
The UUVs are very expensive, so the designers put a lot of effort to guarantee security 
of these vehicles. The company Kongsberg provides the special safety features like: 
 Emergency Localization 
 Health Monitoring and 
 Communication and Tracking 
The vehicle can be equipped with emergency radio beacon, satellite communication 
and strobe light to assist with recovery operation and emergency localization. In the emergency 
situation, via the Iridium network, the position and status of the vehicle can be sent to base 
simplifying port and to the operators – the emergency localization. In the case if two-way 
satellite communication is enabling, from anywhere in the world, it is possible to transmit 
and obtain mission plan [38].  
The vehicles are also equipped in special designed system to monitor the operation 
and the status of essential components. This system includes monitor of the sensors, 
communication, batteries and also conditions as depth and water ingress. In the case of some 
abnormality information, the alarm is raised. During supervised missions, this information 
will be transmitted to the operator, which is enabling to decide about continuation of the mission 
or about cessation of it. In the case if the vehicle is operating autonomously, the response 
is determined by reselected response which is programmed in the mission plan [38]. 
Via an acoustic or satellite link, the operators can monitor the glider‘s progress 
and the status. This communication allows to making amendments to the mission plan. 
Also many of vehicles are equipped with acoustic positioning systems which allow obtaining 




can communicate via radio o Wi-Fi with the operator. The Seaglider is also equipped in the GPS 
receivers which are able to update the position and provide the most accurate information [38]. 
2.3. Principle of operation of Seaglider 
 The motion of vehicle is obtained by buoyancy control effect by deviation of vehicle-
displaced volume. The pitch and the dive angle are controlled by shifting the internal mass 
(batteries) fore and aft [25]. Seaglider was design to proceed with pitch angle between 16° 
from horizontal to 45° [38]. Seagliders have long cylindrical antenna (0.43-1m) mounted behind 
the principal vehicle body [25]. This antenna is raised above the sea surface by pitching 
the vehicle nose down in order to obtain communication and navigational fixes [25]. Seaglider 
use lithium sulfuryl chloride batteries, which are better than alkaline batteries because 
of two reasons: they are better built (with a much longer shelf) and they have twice the energy 
per unit mass [25]. But they are more expensive and less safer (bigger possibility of explosive 
failure).  
Seagliders uses adjustable ballast instead of external control surfaces to obtain effect 
on vehicle attitude. Thanks of that, the vehicle is controlled with no external moving parts 
and making it more reliable [38]. Seagliders can dive and climb by adjusting their volume 
to be a little larger, smaller or equal to mass of seawater. The control of attitude is performed 
by moving mass inside the vehicle, which eliminate the need for active external parts [10].  
It can operate in wider range of water density without constant adjustment of the static ballast 
thanks to vehicles large variable buoyancy. Seaglider travels at slops as 1:35 to 1:1 [38]. 
The steeper slop is used to maintain position which is called virtual mooring [31]. 
 Gliders used the buoyancy in combination with wings to change the vertical motion 
into horizontal [31]. The wings provide hydrodynamic lift to drive forward as it sinks or rises. 
Thereby they propel themselves forward with low power consumption. Gliders are not so fast 
like AUV with electric motor-driven propellers, but thanks of buoyancy-based propulsion, they 
have high level in range and duration of operation.   The buoyancy in this vehicle is obtained 
by moving oil in and out of an external bladder [31]. The main objective of the design is low 
energy use and cost, high reliability and easiness of operation to perform a mission comparable 
to ocean basin depths [10]. Because drag scales as the square of UUV speed, they have 
of the speed, quadruples mission duration and also double vehicle range.  
On the figure 2.1 is presented sketch of the Seaglider with marked the most important 
parts of the vehicle. These parts are: a- Flooded fiberglass fairing;  b- Antenna mast; c- Wing; d- 
Rudder; e- Acoustic transponder; f- Electronics and 10 VDC lithium sulfuryl chloride primary 
batteries; f -Electronics and 24 VDC lithium sulfuryl chloride primary batteries; h- Isopycnal 















2.3.1. Dive Cycle of Seaglider 
Seaglider moves thought the water in a special pattern which looks like saw-tooth, 
diving to the depths up to 1000 meters. To determine the position, send the collected data, 
and receive the commands via satellite telemetry, it has to surfaces periodically [38]. The dive 
cycle is composed of five main steps, which are presented on the figure 2.2. The vehicle uses 
the difference between actual displacement and it‘s dead-reckoning to estimate depth-average 
current. By appropriate adjusted speed and direction to current averaged, it can set up vertically 
at a fixed geographic position which is called the virtual mooring mode [10]. 
 
Fig.2.2. Seaglider dive cycle (Source: [38])  
The diving cycle can be divided into 5 main steps: 
1. Surface phase: First one is telemetry accomplished with iridium satellite communication 
[38]. At the water surface, the vehicle pitches downward to obtain approximately 45 degree 
to expose the antenna. This is obligatory to receive position from GPS and to transmit 
measurements data and receive new commands [38]. 
2. Diving phase: The vehicle converts its potential energy into kinetic one. To start 
this phase, it needs to empty its ballast and shift its inertial center to front part of body, 
by moving its battery [31]. On figure 2.3 is presented the scheme of moving the batteries 
packages, which allow changing the pitch of vehicle. 
 




To change the vehicle buoyancy, it uses its external bladder. 
 
Fig.2.4. External bladder inflation and deflection (Source: [47]) 
3. Scanning phase: The vehicle uses its kinetic energy to dive. When the vehicle knows 
the distance to the target, the vehicle chooses the appropriate angle (slop) and bearing 
to approach it [38]. Under the water, the vehicle navigates using a 3-axis compass, altimeter 
and pressure sensor. Seaglider can dives maximum a depth of 1000 meters, and collect various 
oceanic data.  To obtain the roll the vehicle moves the batteries from one side to other, which 
is presented on figure 2.5. 
 
Fig.2.5. Mass shifter causing roll changes (Source: [47]) 
 
4. Ascension phase: When the velocity is too small to continue scenic, the glider is going 
up. In this phase, the vehicle moves its battery to his aft part and empties its ballast [31].  
5. Reporting phase: After each surfacing the Seaglider dips its nose down in order to raise 
its antenna out of the water what allow to determining the position via GPS, uploads 
the oceanographic data, data telemetry satellite (via Iridium) and downloads the file 
with new instruction [31]. At the water surface, the vehicle pitches downward to obtain 
approximately 45 degree to expose the antenna. This is obligatory to receive position from GPS 






2.3.2. System of launching and recovering 
 The launch and recovery is possible from small boats. The vehicle size was chosen 
to be suitable to contain necessary parts like buoyancy control system, centered on high-
pressure pump, electronics and batteries to run the vehicle and to be able to be lunching 
and recovery from smaller vessels. 
The launch and recovery of UUV is one of the main challenges especially in open water 
and rough seas. The Seaglider weighs only 52 kilograms, so it can be easily carried by two 
people. Two main launching methods are presented on the following figures. 
 
Fig.2.6. Launching methods for Seagliders (Source: [38]) 
2.4. Communication and navigation systems of vehicle 
 For UUVs, the issues like navigation and communication are very demanding aspects, 
because there are a little bit options for sent messages underwater [48]. First of all, 
the communication underwater uses acoustic waves which are less efficient comparing 
with electromagnetic waves. Above ground, it is possible to transmit data at speed 
approximately light speed, but in the water, the same signal has to pass through obstacle. 
In the Seaglider, this problem was solved by employment special diving cycle and the vehicle 
(antenna) can send the data when is above water surface. 
The vehicle is equipped in standard components like: GPS, Iridium modem, Combined 
GPS with Iridium antenna, Acoustic transponder, 3-axis compass, base station software, 
external on-deck communication port, Kalman filter for mean and oscillatory currents 
and bathymetry map system with acoustic altimeter for near bottom dives [38]. 
 The underwater altimeter at the beginning was using to measure the altitude of object 
above the sea bottom. Nowadays, altimeters from Kongsberg Mesotech‘s company are used 
in positioning, below surface monitoring and berthing. They have a robust design and are very 
easy to configurable by digital or analog outputs. They have wide range of operating depth 




 The Kalman filter (linear quadratic estimator) is an algorithm which uses a series 
of measurements (over some time) containing: statistical noise and inaccuracies, and it is able 
to produce estimates of unknown variables. These unknown variables tend to be more precise, 
than these one based on a single measurement (based for example on Bayesian inference). 
This filter has a lot of applications in technology, especially in navigation, control of vehicles 
and guidance. 
 Bathymetric charts are maps which present the above water topographic bottom. They 
are created to present accurate and measurable description to visual the submerged terrain. 
The Global Positioning System also known as Navstar GPS is the most popular navigation 
satellite system, which provides geolocation and information about time to GPS receiver. 
This system has an intrinsic error source, which has to be taken into account. The main error 
is due to inaccurate time keeping by clock  receiver‘s). Other source of errors is atmospheric 
disturbances, reflection from building or another solid object, which distort the travelling signal 
before it reaches the receiver. The typical accuracy of GPS cannot be bigger than 3 meters. 
One of the causes is Selective Availability, which it is a purposeful disruption by US military. 
 Seaglider due to its properties found a lot of applications in Marine Biology (fisheries 
researches, aquaculture, seep sea ecology), in Physical Oceanography (climate changes, 
ocean observation), in environmental monitoring (emergency response, water quality, 
ecosystem assessment) or in offshore, oil and gas industry (baseline environmental 
assessment, geophysical survey) [38]. 
2.5. System representation 
A main tasks of the representation of system is to enhance and facilitate 
the identification of different scenarios of events, which include all possible situations like large 
loads, chemical substances etc. The system can be present as a combination of different 
events acting on it [11]. Environment in which the system is working has to be taken 
into consideration. The vehicle is composed on different sub-system like:  hull, sensors, 
navigational equipment, etc. To perform good risk analysis, all of the sub-systems 
and possibility scenarios have to be taken into account. On the figure 2.7 is presented 
the system representation. There is illustrated the area of operation, possible exposures, 
but also the sub-system like Hull, which has his own exposures. The sub-system Hull 
was illustrated as an example, but it cannot be forgotten that the system is composed of many 
different sub-systems. 
The failure of the system which is caused by failure of the components is considered 
as a direct consequence [11]. The combination of constituent failures and the consequences 
cause appearance of indirect consequences. Indirect consequences can be caused for example 
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Indirect consequence: 
Damage of the closing 
Direct consequence: 





Reduce capacity of 
researches 
Indirect consequence: 





3. RISK ANALYSIS METHODS 
3.1. Definition of risk and risk analysis 
At the beginning, will be defined the word “risk”. In the literature are many different 
definitions, especially in different branch and sections of engineering. According 
to BuisnessDictionary a risk is:  
”A probability or threat of damage, injury, liability, loss, or any other negative occurrence that 
is caused by external or internal vulnerabilities, and small that be avoided through preemptive 
action."
3
 In short a risk is: "the Possibility that something bad or unpleasant will happen"
4
 
According to Ayyub B.M. (Risk Analysis and Management for Marine Systems, p.3): 
“Risk is defined as the potential for loss as a result of a system failure, and can be measured as 
a pair of factors, one being the potential outcome or consequence associated with the 
event‟s occurrence. This pairing can be represented by the equation” 3.1:  
     ,(     ) (     )   (     )-                                            (3.1) 
Where: 
  - is the probability that the event x will occur 
  -is the consequence or outcome of the event‘s occurrence 
 For each risk, two main assessments have to be done: likelihood 
and the consequences. Risk is also defined as the product of the likelihood (probability) 
of an event‘s occurrence and the impact of the event, which illustrated equation 3.2 [2]:   
    .
           
    
/            .
     
    
/        .
           
     
/                  (3.2) 
Risk analysis is connected with survey of the risk, their probability and evaluation. 
The formula implies that some form of qualitative or quantitative analysis has to be performed. 
Risk analysis is a process in which, first of all, hazard has to be identified and then analyzed 
and evaluated the risk connected with the hazard. The word hazard is often confused 
with the definition of the risk. According to dictionary a hazard is: “an unavoidable danger 
or risk, even though often foreseeable‖
5
. 
Risk analysis can be defined in many different ways, depend on how the risk 
is connected with other concepts. Risk management is broader definition and can be performed 
in seven steps [16]:  
1. Establishing the goal and context 
2. Risk identification 
                                               
3Business Dictionary http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/risk.html 






3. Analysis the risk 
4. Evaluating the risk 
5. Managing or treating the risk 
6. Monitoring the risk 
7. Communication (consulting with stakeholders and reporting) 
To facilitate, the risk analysis can be divided into two main components: risk 
assessment which is associated with identification, evaluation and measure the probability 
and intensity of risk, and second component: risk management, where have to be decided 
what to do about the risks [15]. 
 The first step is to understand the environment of the system. It means to get to know 
external and internal environment of the device. This part of analysis has to contain 
identification of constrains and opportunities. Methods to perform such a task are for example: 
SWOT and PEST which means in sequence Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
and Political, Societal and Technological [21]. 
 Second point, which is risk identification, is critical stage in good risk assessment 
process. Method of identification will depend on area of application: the nature of process, 
available resources, client‘s requirements etc. Risk identification of system may yield a large 
number of potential risks, what can make that each one will not be detailed analyze. In this step, 
fundamental methods are: HAZOP-Hazard and Operability studies, brainstorming, FTA- Fault 
Tree Analysis, logic diagrams o FMEA-Failure Mode and Effect Analysis [2]. 
 To analyze the risk they have to be taken into consideration the source of the risk, 
the likelihood, and the consequences. In this point all techniques: quantitative, qualitative 
and semi-quantitative are acceptable, depend on the availability of the data. The risk matrix 
which is presented in figure 3.4 will be very useful in this step [16]. 
 The forth step is to evaluate the risk, that means to compare it with the previously 
approved and documented tolerable risk criteria. If there is a situation in which the predictable 
risk is higher than tolerable, then the feature needs improvements in the effectiveness 
or additional control measures. The decision about acceptance of the risk has to be taken 
by appropriate designer or manager. The risk should be monitored and reviewed to ensure 
it remain acceptable [16]. 
 If there is a situation that the risk cannot be acceptable, then it requires special 
treatment. They are available four treatment options: avoiding the risk, reducing the risk, 
transferring the risk or retaining the risk, which are illustrated on figure 3.1. In this step, the main 
process is to expand cost effective choice for treating the risk. These options are not mutually 
exclusive or appropriate, because this depends on the situations and outcomes. To choose 
appropriate kind of risk treatment, different factors should be considered like: if the possibility 
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Fig.3.1. Treatment of the risk (Source: [13]) 
The sixth step is to monitor the risk. The risk has to be monitored continuously because 
the risk is dynamic and can change periodically. Also new risk can occur in the time 
of operation. In this step it is very important to describe how the outcomes will be measured. 
The period of reviews is determined by the environment, if the system is operating in variable 
and difficult environment, then the system has to be review more often.  
The last step is communication, which is an essential stage of risk management 
process. To successful operation of system or organization is very important to reporting 
the risky situations. The reporting can be performed by annotation in documentation 
for example in management handbook [16]. The documentation is essential because can help 
in the future and provide history information about the causes, evolution and possible risks. 
Risk analysis methods can be divided into two groups: quantitative or qualitative. 
The appropriate method depends on the availability of data and the level of knowledge 
of personnel. Risk assessment is a scientific and technical process in which the risk of event 
is modeled and quantified [2]. 
3.2. Quantitative risk analysis methods  
Quantitative risk analysis is a technique concerned mainly on numerical calculations 
of probability over the possible consequences. This type of risk analysis tries to obtain 
numerically probability for the potential consequences. Often is called probabilistic risk analysis 
or probabilistic risk assessment– PRA [46].This analysis often describes and present results 
in numerical units like dollars, live lost or time. Probabilistic risk analysis tries to find answers 
for following questions: 
 What may happen? What can go wrong? 
 How it is possible? What is the probability that it will happen? 
 If it does happen, what consequences to expect? 
The most widely known and adopted risk definition is this one proposed by Kaplan 
and Garrick [28]. In this quantitative definition of risk, the answer to the first question is denoted 





which is denoted by   . The answer to the last question is the outcome o result   , which 
is generated by the process-sequence of events. Thereby a risk is defined as a set of triples, 
and is formulated by equation 3.3: 
*        +                                                                           (   ) 
Where i=1, 2,…, N and N is the total number of events which may happen, and should be big 
enough to form a ―complete‖ set. 
Each scenario is a totality of events illustrated formula 3.4:  
   *               +                               (3.4) 
This information is produced for example by Fault Tree Analyses or similar methods 
which are associated with engineering safety studies [4]. Each of scenarios presents a thorough 
concentration of events. For example is     is the initiating event which occurs with probability 
  ( ), then all succeeding event in this chain will occur with probabilities   ( |   ), 
and the likelihood of the scenario which is composed by K event presented by equation 3.5: 
     ( )    ( | )    (  |    )               (3.5) 
The last two elements of risk definition proposed by Kaplan and Garrick specify 
a probability distribution over the result. The likelihood of the outcomes is identical 
to the likelihood of scenario. This is the Probabilistic Risk assessment heart. 
To perform a risk assessment, people created several methods, which some of them 
are presented below in table 3.1. Each method is suitable in different stage of circle life 
or to obtain another result.  
Table 3.1. Quantitative Risk Analysis Methods  
Quantitative methods Scope 
Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) 
Inductive modeling approach. Identifies the components failure 
modes and the impacts on surrounding components of the 
system 
Failure Modes Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
Inductive modeling approach. The same like FMEA 
Fault tree Analysis (FTA) Deductive modeling approach. Identify combination 
of equipment failure and human errors that can result in an 
accident 
Event tree Analysis (ETA) Inductive modeling approach. Identify various sequences 
of events, both failures and successes that can lead 
to an accident 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA)  Methodology for quantitative risk assessment developed by the 
nuclear engineering community for risk assessment. This 
comprehensive process may use a combination of risk 
assessment methods. 
 (Source: [9]) 
In science this probabilities measure has been known a hundred years, but specific 
modes were developed specially to analyze engineering risk associated with space shuttle 
and nuclear power plants. Nowadays probabilistic risk assessment is applying in areas like 




3.2.1. Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is deductive failure form of analysis. In this method undesired 
state of system is analysed using a Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level events. 
This method is often used in fields like: safety engineering, reliability engineering, in fields like 
aerospace, nuclear power, pharmaceutical o high-hazard industries. This analysis allows 
understanding how and why the system can fail, shows the best way to reduce the risk, 
investigates potential faults and quantifies their contribution to system unreliability. 
In this method the graphical symbols are used, which are easy to understand and are based 
on Boolean logic. 
First of all, analysis is performed from top and proceeds to down. Very important 
elements are: gates which are representing outcomes and events, which are representing 
inputs to the gates. At the top of tree is undesired outcome (root) for example failure 
of navigational system. Working backward from this event, they have to be determined 
the reasons that could cause this failure during for example normal operation or during 
maintenance operation. It should be remember that it is possible that are several different 
causes of failures. These causes introduce relations between events. When a specific event 
has a define failure probabilities, it can be calculated failure probabilities from tree analysis. 
This analysis is based on Boolean algebra and every gate has their significance. Below 
in the table 3.2 are presented basic gates and theirs meanings. 
Table 3.2.Basic gates used in Fault Tree Analysis  
Gate Illustration Significant 
OR 
 
The output occurs if ANY input occurs 
AND 
 








The output occurs if the inputs occur in specific sequence  
(Source: [33])  
The Boolean algebra is the branch of algebra in which the values of the variables 
are denoted as 1 for truth values and 0 for false values. The main operations 
are the conjunction denoted as ∧, the disjunction denoted as V and negation denoted as ¬. 
Symbols are used to describing logical relations in very similar way like original algebra 







Table 3.3. Boolean algebra basic and composed operations  
X y x∧y xVy xy x⊕y x ≡ y 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
(Source: [33]) 
 From the basic operations can be obtained composed operations, including 
the following examples: 
 x → y or Cxy is called material implication. If first value x is true, then the value 
of operation has a value of y. In other way, if x is false, the value of y can be ignored, 
because operation returns truth value. 
 x ⊕ y or Jxy is called exclusive or XOR. Can be understand as x≠y, being true only 
if x and y are different 
 x ≡ y or Exy is called equivalence or Boolean equality. It is true when x and y have the 
same value [33]. 
 Based on Boolean algebra can be prepared a fault event tree. Starting from top event, 
have to be analyzed what can cause that event, and depending between the scenarios. 
3.2.2. Event Tree Analysis 
 Event Tree Analysis is very similar especially in problem-solving, according to Fault 
Tree analysis but has some difference and they are used in different situations. Event tree 
analysis uses logical induction to proceed from general point of view to the specific, but Fault 
Tree Analysis is used to deductive reasoning or backward, in the other words, to move 
from general point of view to more specific. This type of analysis is also intended as a data-
driven method.  
 The structure of an event tree involves following steps [20]:   
 The identification of a first (initiating event) for accident sequence and its possibility 
of occurrence 
 State the different components of the system, which can be affected by the initiating 
event 
 Define the sequences of accidents though the different system workings assuming 
the two binary states : success state, failure state 
 Designate possibilities or probabilities for the failure and success states 
 Assign the Boolean expression for accidents assuming logical gate –AND 




When the main steps have been performed, then estimation of probability of each 
of sequences is needed [20]. In the system with binary nature the sum of probabilities of failure 
and success is equal to unity and can be formulated by equation 3.6: 
 ( )   ( )                                                                                  (3.6) 
After transformation the formula 3.6, the following equation 3.7 is obtained: 
 ( )     ( )     (3.7) 
Assuming the independence of events and logical Boolean expression- AND in each accident 
sequence, the probability of the accident can be written as formula 3.8:  
 (       )   (               )   ( ) (  ) (  )                          (3.8) 
And substituting from equation 3.7 into equation 3.8, following equation 3.9 is obtained: 
 (       )   ( ) (  ) (    )                                                (3.9) 
The possibilities or probabilities are generated from Fault Tree Analysis, which 
describes the top event estimating the probability of failure of each component in the system 
of interest. It is also possible to combine this two methods and carrying out joint analysis, which 
is presented on figure 3.2. 
 








3.3. Qualitative risk analysis methods 
 Qualitative methods can be used to screening the risk sources, but higher risks 
are subject to more complicated and expensive quantitative methods [16]. The risk can 
be estimated by qualitative methods using tools like: risk graphs, hazard matrices, risk matrices 
or monographs, but the most popular method is risk matrix [34]. In the table 3.4 have been 
collected different qualitative risk analysis methods. 
Table 3.4. Qualitative Risk Analysis Methods  
Qualitative methods Scope 
Safety/Review Audit To identify equipment conditions or operating procedures that could lead 
to a casualty or result in property damage or environmental impacts 
What-if Identify hazardous situations, hazard or accident events that could result 
in undesirable and unwanted consequences. 
Checklist To ensure that organizations are complying with standard practice. 
Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) 
Inductive modeling approach. Identify and their causes that can lead 
to undesirable consequences and determine recommended actions 
to reduce the frequency and/or consequences of the deviations.  
Hazard and Operability 
Study (HAZOP) 
Identify system deviations and their causes that can lead to undesirable 
consequences and determine recommended actions to reduce the 
frequency and/or consequences of the deviations. 
(Source: [2]) 
3.3.1. Brainstorming 
 Brainstorming is mainly used to identify risks, hazards, stakeholders, risk management 
options or decision criteria. This is approach to obtain ideas from a group of people 
(participants), especially to generate a large number of creative ideas in short period of time, 
but does not involve the analysis. For successful brainstorming following inputs are required 
[36]: the problem which is well-defined, a team of people who has knowledge about the 
problem, a facilitator/mediator, good brainstorming technique and recording and disseminating 
the result of the process. 
 The output of a brainstorming could be a list of ideas, which can be later used 
for example in Fault Tree Analysis.  The strengths of this action is that identifies new risks 
and new solutions, it is relatively easy to perform, it is quick and also involve key stakeholders 
and aids for communication overall. The weaknesses of these methods are: 
 Social phenomena called ―groupthink‖  
 Strong personalities or bosses which dominate the group 
 Difficult to get the right mix of knowledge and skills in the group 





3.3.2. Preliminary Hazard Analysis –PHA 
 In the industry different variants of PHA are known, sometimes under different names 
like: Hazard Identification (HAZID) o Rapid Risk Ranking [22]. This method is a semi-
quantitative, which is performed to obtain 3 main objectives: 
 to identify all accidental events and potential hazard which are possibly to cause 
an accident 
 to rank accidental events according to their intensity 
 and to recognize hazard controls and following activities 
 This type of analysis is used to study risk in early stage of a project. Thank of that, 
it can be identified accidental event, which may occur and can be estimated the severity of each 
action. It allows focusing on important issues and putting them in more detailed analyses. 
This analysis is very important for future detailed risk analysis of an existing system o system 
concept. If a simple system is analysed, this method can provide good and complete analysis. 
The Preliminary Hazard Analysis should consider objectives like [22]: 
 dangerous components  
 safety relations between different system elements (including also the software) 
 environment, the constrains of environment 
 fails of the system, subsystems and software‘s 
 support equipment, property installed equipment and facilities 
 safety procedures, safety equipment, maintenance, emergency procedures or possible 
alternate approaches 
 PHA consists of four main steps. First one is prerequisites like: establish appropriate 
PHA team, collect information about the risk from similar system or from precious operations. 
The good source of information can be accident data bases. They should be analysed: 
the system, system‘s description (block diagrams, drawings, etc.), environmental conditions, 
systems for detection hazards, emergency systems, etc. A good PHA team should consist 
of facilitator, secretary to report the results and team members who have an appropriate 
knowledge and experience [22]. Sometimes to identify all hazards and events, system must 
be split into parts. The result of this analysis can be reported using special worksheet 





Fig.3.3. PHA worksheet (Source: [42]) 
 Second main step is hazard identification. It is important to consider all hazards 
and accidents which may happen. They have to be taken into consideration all parts of system, 
safety systems, maintenance operations and operational modes. All hazards shall be recorded. 
Sources of hazards should be analysed, some of them are common like: fire, explosion, moving 
parts, system incompatibilities, collision, toxic liquids, software error, human error, biological 
hazards etc. To identify hazards could be used following methods: brainstorming, examine 
existing system, review previous analyses of systems, consider hazardous materials, consider 
human errors or think about worst case using what-if analysis. The additional source of the data 
can be reports from authorities, dangerous occurrence reports, accident database o expert 
judgement. 
 Third step is to estimate the frequency and the intensively of each events. As was 
defined before, the risk is an event in function of the possibility and the severity 
of its consequences. The event may refer to wide ranges of consequences, from negligible 
to catastrophic. The intensively can be classified into broad classes. In the table 3.5 
are presented example of classification of severity and frequency. Scenarios of different risk 
can be created by brainstorming or Fault Tree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) or Event Tree Analysis (ETA). The probability can be presented either deterministically 
or probabilistically [22]. 






5 Catastrophic Major injury or death of personnel Frequent Once per month or 
more often 
4 Critical Personnel exposure to harm 
chemicals, radiation, fire or release 
of chemical to the environment 
Probable 
 
Once per year 
3 Moderate Low level of exposure to personnel, 
or activates facility alarm system 
Occasional Once per 10 years 
2 Minor Minor system damage, not injury to 
personnel 
Remote Once per 100 years 
 




Once per 1000 years 





 The risk is recognized as a combination of a given event‘s consequence and severity. 
This enable to ranking the events in a risk matrix, which is presented on figure 3.4. This is fourth 
step in the procedure- risk ranking. 
 
Fig.3.4. Risk Matrix (Source: [22]) 
This method has the advantages like: it ensures that the system is safe, it decreases 
design time thanks of reducing the number of surprises events and because the modification 
are cheaper and easier in earlier stages of work. The method has following disadvantages: 
interactions between hazards and are not easily known. 
3.3.3. What-if method 
 What-if analysis is a method which uses a brainstorming to determine what 
can go wrong and judge the consequences and likelihood of these unwanted actions. 
The answers to these questions are useful to make judgment concerning the acceptability of the                        
risk and they can help to determine a recommended action for these risks [39]. 
 Review team consist of an experienced people, who can productively and effectively 
recognize issues concerning the system or process. Each member of the team, based on their 
knowledge and past experience of similar situation, is deciding what can go wrong. The team 
usually include people like: designer, operating engineers, maintenance personnel or safety 
representative, which has specific skills in fields like structural engineer, chemistry or radiation 
[39]. 
 On each step of the process, what-if questions are asked and the answers 
are generated. The analysis is performed until all of the potential hazards are identified, 
because it provides minimization of the chance that some problem is not overlooked. The team 
makes assessment concerning the severity and likelihood. When some risk is unacceptable, 
the recommendations are made by the team for the next actions [39].   
 This type of analysis consists of three main steps. First one is developing the ‗what-if 
questions‘ using previous documents and knowledge of the team. The questions 
can be formulated based on process upsets, equipment failures and human errors. All situations 
have to been analysed, during normal operation, construction, maintenance activities and de-




not trained operators, incorrect procedures, latest updates not used, utility failures such a gas 
or steam, external influences as weather etc. Personnel have appropriate knowledge of past 
failures and experience, which should be used to prepare what-if questions. 
 Second step is to determine the answers to questions: What can occur? What would 
be the result?  If this step is performed correctly, the designers can solve not only safety 
problems but also minimize quality of operating problems. The last step is to assess the risk 
and making recommendations. The team members need to make assessment concerning 
the risk level and its acceptability.  
 3.3.4. Safety Checklist 
 The check list analysis is an evaluation against previously agreed criteria [42]. 
A checklist is used to reduce probability of failure by paying attention of human memory 
and attention [35].  It is systematic approach which is built on the knowledge and uses detailed 
analysis on high level.  It is based on documentations reviews, interviews and field inspections. 
It is applicable for any system or activity, including human factors and equipment issues. Mostly 
it is performed by individual person, who is trained to understand checklist questions.  
 The performing of the checklist can be divided into seven steps, which are as follows 
[42]: 
1. Definition of the activity or the system. Specification and definition of the boundaries  
2. Definition of the problems for the analysis. Specification of the problems (environmental 
problems, safety issues or economic impacts) 
3. Subdivision of the system or activity for analysis. Section of the subject into its major 
elements. At this level, the analysis will start.  
4. Creation of relevant checklist. Identification and collection of important issues 
or questions related  to the type of problems within the analysis 
5. Answer to the checklist questions. The team of expert should respond to questions. 
Development of recommendations for improvement in case if the potential risk seems 
to be uncomfortable or unnecessary. 
6. Subdivision of the elements of the system or activity. It may be necessary to perform 
more detailed analysis.  
7. Using the results in decision making. Evaluation of recommendations 
and implementation, which will bring benefits over the life cycle.  
This type of analysis is often using to guide team of inspectors about critical issues 






3.4. Software’s used for risk assessment 
Nowadays in engineering can be found different software‘s which are very helpful 
in the risk analysis. They are used in such branches like: financial sector, chemical or explosive 
industry. In the first branch, the QRA is used to calculate single loss expectancy. In chemical 
industry is used to define the potential loss of life (PLL) and in explosive industry to site risk 
analysis. 
The risk analysis is very important issue in the engineering. To facilitate the work 
of specialists, many different software‘s were created, which are very helpful in the risk 
assessment. Below are presented programs used to perform this task: 
 IMESARF- Institute of Makers of Explosive Safety Analysis for Risk 
 RBM II- Risk Based Management II from Dutch Government 
 iQRAS – ITEMSOFT Quantitative Risk Assessment System from ItemSoft 
 Phast and Safeti- Integrated Consequence and Risk modeling from DNV GL 
Existed also software‘s to assessment the risk used in naval industry or shipping sector like: 
 Safeti Offshore- for Offshore structures with 3D real-time Modeling from DNV GL 
 SOQRATES- Integrated Excel based system of Offshore QRA from DNV GL 
 Shepherd- Frequency assessment software from Shell Global Solutions  
For program Microsoft Excel exist special add-in packages which are available to perform 
risk analysis, for example Ersatz, ModelRisk industrial, Risk Solver pro or Risk analyzer [32]. 
Risk Analyzer is special add which allow performing tasks like: Monte Carlo Risk Analysis 
or automatically summary of results [32]. 
3.5. Basic definitions related to reliability 
Reliability is: “The ability of an item to perform a required function, under given 
environmental and operational conditions and for a stated period of time‖
6
. As a term item 
should be understood any component, system or subsystem. Mentioned required function can 
be a single function but also can be a combination of functions (if it is necessary to provide 
indicated service). Designed items are created to perform specified (one or more) functions, 
but, some of functions are activate and other are passive. In shortly reliability is the probability 
that the system will operate failure free in time [0,t] , what can be presented by formula 3.10: 
 ( )   (   )                                                               (    ) 
Where: T is time to failure 
When the statistical distribution of the time to failure is known the probability density 
function of the time to failure f(t) and the cumulative distribution function of the time to failure 
F(t) can be used. 
                                               
6




Failure rate is the rate at which the failures can occur in the time interval and can 
be presented by formula 3.11: 
 ( )  
 (  )   (  )
(     )   (  )
 
 ( )   (    )
    ( )
[
        
    
]                         (    ) 
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) denotes the mean functioning time and is formulated 
by formula 3.12: 





                                               (    ) 
The availability is:  
”The ability of an item (under combined aspects of its reliability, maintainability and maintenance 
support) to perform its required function at a stated instant of time or over a stated period 
of time”
7
 .  
The availability at time t can be defines by formula 3.13 [23]:  
 ( )    (                             )                           (3.13) 
Where functioning mean that the item is either able to operate or is in active operation. 
The average availability     is defined as mean proportion of time in which the item 
is functioning, and can be presented by formula 3.14: 
    
    
         
                                                             (    ) 
Where: 
     mean time to failure 
      mean time to repair 
 The reliability of system can be measured in different ways in different situation, 
for example using definition of MTTF, failure rate (number of failures per time), survival 
probability (the probability that the item does not fail in a time interval (   -) or availability 
at time t (the probability that the item is able to function at time t) 
 Important measures for the reliability have to been introduced like: 
 ( )  The reliability (survivor) function 
 ( )   The failure rate function 
     The mean time to failure 
    The mean residual life 
 Different probability distribution should to be used to model the lifetime of item like: 






 The exponential distribution  with parameter λ –failure (hazard) rate) 
 The Weibull distribution (with β-shape parameter and α-scale parameter) 
 The gamma distribution (in use three different parameterizations) 
 The lognormal distribution  with parameters µ and σ as the mean and standard 
deviation   ( )) 
 The normal distribution  with parameters µ as the population mean value and σ 
as the population standard deviation) 
 Time to failure:” is the time elapsing from when the item is put into operation until it fails 
for the first time.‖
8
 The starting point is t=0. It is natural to understand that the time to failure 
as a   is a random variable. The relationship between the time to failure T and the state variable 
X(t) is illustrated on the figure 3.5. 
 
Fig.3.5. The relationship between the time do failure and the state variable X(t) (source: [23]) 
3.5.1. Survival estimation- the Kaplan-Meier estimator 
 The most popular estimator of probability of survival is Kaplan-Meier estimator which 
is based on the failure history. The survival database consists of two different types of data: 
censored data and failure data [8]. A censored data is an observation in which failure was 
not observed and failure data present the recorded time at which failure has place. The Kaplan-
Meier estimator is method to estimate the probability of survival, based on the historical data. 
The Kaplan-Meier estimator has formula 3.15:  
 ( )  ∏(
     
  
)
   
   
                                                            (    ) 
Where: 
    Number of entries that haven‘t failed to interval   
   – Number of entries which have failed during interval   
S(k)= 1 for censored data 
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 The estimator uses product rule to calculate probability of system surviving  ( ) 
in sequence of   intervals. The variance for this estimator is computed using Greenwood 
exponential formula
9
, defined as formula 3.16:  
 ̂( )   ( ) ∑
  
  (     )
   
   
                                                    (    ) 
 
3.5.2. Estimations in Statistics 
Estimation in statistics is the process which makes inferences about all population 
based on information concerning a sample. An estimation of a parameter refers to population 
may be expressed in two ways [53]: 
 point estimation of population parameter is a single value of a statistic 
 interval estimate in which is defined interval by two numbers, between which 
a population parameter is said to lie 
In the statistic the confidence interval is used to express the uncertainty and precision 
associated with a sampling method. Three parts make up the confidence interval: confidence 
level, statistic and a margin of error. The confidence level illustrates the uncertainty 
of a sampling method. The margin of error and the statistic describe the precision 
of the method. The range of values below and above the sample statistic is called the margin 
of error. To determine the confidence interval exist three different models: 
 Model 1: The time to failure has a normal distribution. The mean time to failure 
is not known but the standard deviation of the time to failure is known 
 Model 2: The time to failure has a normal distribution. The mean time to failure 
and standard deviation is not known  using Student‘s t-distribution) 
 Model 3: The time to failure has an unknown distribution, the mean time to failure 
and standard deviation of the time to failure is not known. Sample size is large n 30 
In the Model 3 is applying the Central Limit theorem which says: 
 “(…) the distribution of the sum (or average) of a large number of independent, identically 
distributed variables will be approximately normal, regardless of the underlying distribution.”
10
 
Using this assumption (for     ), the confidence interval can be calculated like in Model 1, 
which is described by following formula 3.17:  









                            (    ) 
The quantile of the normal distribution are presented in table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6. Quantiles of the normal distribution 
  0.9 0.95 0.975 0.99 0.995 
  
 
 1.28 1.64 1.96 2.33 2.58 
(Source: [17]) 
The standard deviation is approximate as σ, where the variance is expressed 
by formula 3.18: 
   
 
   
∑(    ̅)
 
 
   
                                                     (    ) 
3.6. Human Reliability- SPR-H method 
 The proper functioning of system depends on different aspects like reliability 
of its technical elements, environmental conditions but also on human actions. These three 
things cannot be consider separately but consider as a holistically problem, treating the person 
as a component of system Man-Technology-Environment. In the engineering exists many 
different Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) methods like: Absolute Probability Judgement, 
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) or Accident Sequence Evaluation 
Program (ASEP). 
Human Error Probability  HEP  is ―A measure of the likelihood that plant personnel will 
fail to initiate the correct, required, or specified action or response in a given situation 




Performance shaping factor is (PSF)—“A factor that influences human performance 
and human error probabilities is considered in the HRA portion of the PRA. In SPAR-H, 
this includes: time available, stress/stressors, complexity, experience/training, procedures, 
ergonomics/human-machine interface, fitness for duty, and work processes‖
12
. 
This method allows evaluating and identifying errors, which may happen, when person 
is acting on system. This method can be very useful, especially when it is difficult to find 
probabilities of failure (few failure databases). It can be assumed that in the large number 
of accident the crucial role plays human error. 
The basis of this method is based on the special table, which contains different 
Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) like: available time, stressors, complexity, experience, 
procedures, ergonomics, fitness for duty and work processes. Two different tasks are taking 
into account: diagnostic and action. For each one, is given a Nominal Human Error Probability 
(NHEP), for diagnosis           and for action            . This difference is because 
diagnosis is based on experience and knowledge to understand the situation and determine 
the action. In case of action, it is based mainly on diagnosis and involves work according 
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guidelines and procedures. The dependency of these two issues can be modelled in case 
if one of the tasks involves two actions. The special table, which allows to assessing if the tasks 
are involved by two actions, can be found in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The SPAR-
H Human Reliability Method (NUREG/CR-6883(2005)). 
To find the human error probability, two formulas are used. First one, formula 3.19 
is used when more than three PSF are bigger than 1. In the other cases formula 3.20 is used. 
         ∏                                                                (    ) 
    
     ∏   
     ∏(     )   
                                                   (    ) 
 In the case if two actions are taken into account (action and diagnosis) 
them the probability can be calculated from equation 3.21: 
                                                                         (    ) 
At the beginning, this method has been used in the nuclear industry. The method 
can be applied in this thesis because Unmanned Underwater Vehicle is complex system which 
requires a high level of skill of personnel and wrong decision can lead to an undesired outcome. 
In the other hand this method is complex and different environments can be modelled. 
In the table 3.7 are listed all PSF and descriptions of levels.  
Table 3.7. PSF in the SPAR-H method 
 




4. RISK ANALYSIS  
 Because of modern design methods for bridges, buildings or vessel they can survive 
extreme storms are exemplified of development of design methods which are great success 
in controlling of the risk. UUVs have a lot of different sources of risk like: human error, 
equipment failure, external event etc. First source, can be met when the crew is lack of skill, 
they are exhausted, fatigued or commit sabotage. Equipment failure is the most frequently 
hazard of marine systems, such a loss of steering or loss of electrical power. To external events 
can be included a collision with other object, grounding, sea state, or demanding weather 
conditions [6]. 
4.1. Failure database- Project GROOM 
 To perform a proper risk assessment, it is obligatory to has the information 
about the same (or very similar) object, which had a possibility to work in its proper 
environment, or to perform a lot of different tests to check if the object is safety and suitable 
to work. The Project GROOM – Gliders for Research, Ocean Observation and Management, 
accumulated 18 European partners to work together to ―design a new European Research 
Infrastructure that uses underwater for collecting oceanographic data‖ 
13
. The participants 
provided operational data from period of 2 years. The participants by online survey entered data 
like: vehicle identifier, start of mission, mission type, vehicle type, maximum depth, 
did the mission end with success or with failure or was the vehicle recovered 
at the end of mission [8]. If the mission has not finished with the success, the user had to select 
from 15 options, the primary cause of the failure. The options were as follows: 
 Collision with the vessel 
 Collision with seabed 
 Collision with net or other obstacle 
 Leak 
 Iridium communications failure 
 Power/battery failure 
 Buoyancy pump failure 
 Onboard software failure 
 Control/command software failure 
 Navigation sensor failure 
 Data logging failure 
 Altitude control 
 Sensor failure 
 Attitude sensor failure (roll, pitch, heading) 
 Other failure 
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To the project, 205 missions have been reported, which were carried by 56 underwater 
gliders. The number of gliders and number of missions for different institutes are presented 
below in the table 4.1.  


















Centre National de la 
RecherbeScientifique 
56 14 32 12 (7) 84(47) 4(2) 
Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Cientificas 
14 5 19 - - 100 (14) 
IsitutoNazionale di 
Oceanografia e di 
GeofisicaSperimentale 
4 2 13 75 (3) - 25 (1) 
Alfred-Wegner-Institut fur Polar- 
und Meeresforschung 
8 4 69 - - 100 (8) 
Consorcio para el Diseno, 
Construccion, Equipamiento y 
Explotacion de la Plataforma 
Oceanica de Canarias 
14 4 13 7 (1) 22 (3) 71 (10) 
University of East Anglia 12 8 49 42 (5) 50 (6) 8 (1) 
Oceanography Centre, 
University of Cyprus 
7 2 80 71 (5) 29 (2) _ 
Institut fur 
Meereswissenschaften 
3 1 14 _ _ 100 (3) 
Helmoltz-ZentrumGeesthacht- 
Zentrum fur Material- und 
Kustenforschung 
12 2 23 100 (12) _ _ 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 
63 8 4 33 (21) 30 (19) 37 (23) 
Scottish Association for Marine 
Science 
3 2 123 _ 33 (1) 67 (2) 
Natural Environment Research 
Council 
9 4 39 _ 33 (3) 67 (6) 
(Source: [8]) 
It is very important to remember that success of missions not depend 
only on the reliability of the particular type of UUV but also on the factors like the environment, 
the service history or on the procedures and on the practices of the operators [14]. 
Also the available options for recovery of UUV could lead on loss of the device [8]. In the table 
4.2 is presented summary of glider‘s operation statistics depend on the type of vehicle based 






















Number of missions 42 68 72 9 14 
Total endurance (days) 2514,5 772,05 1728 188 550,1 
Median endurance (days) 64 7,65 19,5 18 12 
Upper quartile (days) 80 15 37 25 25,8 
Max endurance (days) 169 56 105 48 184 
No. of aborts due to failures  19 13 23 3 5 
Abort rate (per day) 0,00756 0,0168 0,0133 0,0159 0,00909 
Number of losses 7 2 1 0 0 
(Source: GROOM Project database) 
 After analyzing the data about failures of Seaglider in project GROOM, it is possible 
to prepare a graph which illustrate the percentage of mission, which are finished 
with successfully, missions, which have to be canceled due to failure and number of vehicle 
lost. The diagram 4.1 illustrated that from 42 missions (for Seaglider), only 16 of them have 
finished with success. On the other hand, 7 missions have finished due to the loss of vehicle. 
 
Diag.4.1. The percentage of the missions finished with failure (mission abort), losses of vehicle 







Seaglider 1000m statistics 
No. Of aborts due to failures
(19)
Number of losses (7)




4.1.1. Probability density function of failure of Seaglider 
The gliders sold by Kongsberg Company are Seagliders type 1000 meters. In the table 
4.2 in the second column is information about number of missions, times of endurance 
and number of losses of this type of equipment. Using definition of Weibull distribution, 
it is possible to calculate and present probability density function which is described by equation 
4.1 [32]: 













    
     
                                        (   ) 
The scale parameter λ is defined as time (range) after which 63,2% of devices 
will be failure.  The shape parameter β is used to model situations where probability of failure 
changes over time and can obtained fallowing values: 
 β<1, indicate that failure rate decreases over time 
 β=1, failure rate is constant (Exponential distribution) 
 β>1, failure rate is increasing with time 
Diag.4.2. Probability Density functions of failure of Seaglider (Own development) 
 If parameter β is equal to 3.4, the probability density function will have normal 




normal distribution (green), exponential (red) and Weibull distribution (blue). To calculate 
possibility of loss of Seaglider, it has to be calculated integral of these functions in defined 
boundaries, which is formulated by equation 4.2 [44]:  
 ( )  ∫  ( )  
 
 
                                              (4.2) 
4.1.2. Percentage of reasons of failures 
To the project GROOM was reported 205 missions and 63 of them were abort. 
The project specified seventeen different failure modes, which are presented below in the table 
4.3 and on the diagram 4.3.  
Table 4.3. Number of failures and aborts in function of different causes 
Cause: No. of failures 
Percentage of cause 
[%] 
Percentage of cause 
in all missions [%] 
Leak 15 23,81 7,32 
Battery/ power failure 9 14,29 4,39 
Buoyancy pump failure 6 9,52 2,93 
Collision with a vessel 4 6,35 1,95 
Science sensor failure 4 6,35 1,95 
Iridium communications failure 4 6,35 1,95 
Unknown 4 6,36 1,95 
Attitude control failure 3 4,76 1,46 
Collision with the seabed 2 3,17 0,98 
Data Logging failure 2 3,17 0,98 
Glider recovered by a fishing boat 2 3,17 0,98 
Control/command software failure 1 1,59 0,49 
Onboard software failure 1 1,59 0,49 
Air bladder leak 1 1,59 0,49 
Rudder broken 1 1,59 0,49 
Argos failure 1 1,59 0,49 
Fin locked at a fixed position 1 1,59 0,49 
Digifin not working properly 1 1,59 0,49 
Roll motor failure 1 1,59 0,49 
 Number of aborts 63 100 30,73 
Number of missions  205 30,73   
(Source: [8]) 
 The main cause of the failures was: leak (23,81% of total failures), battery/power failure 
(14,29%), buoyancy pump failure (9,52%), collision with a vessel, science sensor failure, iridium 





Diag.4.3. The percentage of the specific cause in the general number of failures and missions (Source: 
Own development based on [8]) 
4.2. Difficult area of operation 
4.2.1. Coaster water analyzed using Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
 It was assumed that the researches are performed in Polish Port- Gdynia. It is the port 
on the Baltic Sea. The position of the port is: ϕ: 54°32΄10 N, λ=018° 33΄61 E. The harbour 
is one of the most modern and largest ports within the Baltic area, which can handle 
with all kinds of cargo. The density of water is           . The approach channel in 2009 
had a depth 14.1m.  
There are abnormal water levels: during long period of W winds the water level increase 
up to 0.6 m, E winds can decrease the water level by 0.5 m. In 2009 to Gdynia port arrived 3700 
vessels with 32.5 millions of tons of cargo. The port is generally free of ice. Ice formation can 
occur especially from February to March. Winds from N, E and S can cause shifting ice fields 
in the roadstead which may create problems for small and medium-sized vessels. There 
is generally a weak N current set off the entrance to Gdynia Harbour. During winds from 
N to NE the set may turn to the S. Depending on the strength of the wind, the current may attain 
a rate of 2 kn.   
A lot of failures have place in the coastal waters. To analysis it has been chose port 
in Poland- Gdynia. It was chosen fourteen different hazards which can meet the Seaglider 
in operation on the coastal waters which are presented in the table 4.4 









Collision with the seabed
Data Logging failure
















Table 4.4. Preliminary Hazard Analysis for conditions of coaster water 




Poor commands, errors in navigation, not trained 
operator, human errors, unexpected/unreported 
movement of ship in the area, prohibited movement 
of the vessels 
Remote Catastrophic 
2 
Collision with other 
UUV 
Poor commands, errors in navigation, not trained 






Getting stuck in 
net 
Unmarked nets, nets in prohibited area, errors in 
navigation 
Remote Moderate 
4 Getting stuck in ice  Unexpected glaciations, errors in navigation Remote Moderate 
5 
Pushed by strong 
current 
Bad measurements, not taken into account 






Pushed by high 
tide 
Bad measurements, not taken into account 
information about tides in area, unexpected high 







Uncharted wrack, poor commands, human error, 
not trained operator, previously untested area, 
errors in navigation 
Remote Catastrophic 
8 Grounding 
Poor commands, human error, not trained 







Poor commands, errors in navigation, uncharted 
marine infrastructure 
Occasional Critical 
10 The human activity 
Unexpected human activity, human activity in 
prohibited area, unreported human activity  
Probable Negligible 
11 
Collision with the 
anchor chain 
Vessel anchoring in inadequate position, poor 
commands, uncharted area of anchoring, 







Unexpected current or wave, bad measurements, 
poor commands, not trained operator 
Remote Catastrophic 
13 Loss of vehicle 
Human error, unexpected obstacles, error of 







Poor commands, errors in setting up the vehicle, 
human error, unexpected weather conditions 
Remote Moderate 
(Source: Own development) 
Using the Risk Matrix, from table 4.5, it is possible to determine which hazards in view 
of likelihood and severity are the most demanding. The most demand scenario for Seaglider 
operating in coastal water are: collision with vessel, with wreck or with marine infrastructure. 
Table 4.5. Scales to assess the probability and severity of hazards and Risk Matrix 
a) Scale of severity and probability 
Severity classes Probability classes 
5 Catastrophic 5 Very unlikely 
4 Critical/ significant 4 Remote 
3 Moderate 3 Occasional 
2 Minor 2 Probable 










1 2 3 4 5 
1 Low medium Medium Medium High High High 
2 Low Low Medium Medium   Medium High High 
3 Low Low Medium Medium Medium High Medium High 
4 Low Low Medium Low Medium Medium   Medium High 
5 Low Low Low Medium Medium Medium High 
(Source: Own development based on: [22]) 
4.2.2. Comparison between areas of operation- based on Kaplan Maier estimator 
To analyze the quality of operation of glider in the different areas, the information 
about numbers of aborts in shelf and shelf-edge has to be taken into consideration. 
The information about the number of missions, vehicles and aborts is presented in table 4.1, 
which shows information about missions in coastal water and on deep sea from the Project 
GROOM. The totally number of shallow water missions is 135; 54 missions on shelf and 81 
missions on shelf edge. The totally number of deep ocean missions is 70. The survival 
estimation can be based on Kaplan-Maier Estimator, which is presented by equation 4.3: 
 ( )  ∏(
     
  
)
   
   
                                                               (   ) 
Where:  
    Number of entries that haven‘t failed to interval   
   – Number of entries which have failed during interval   
Three different regions of operations have been analyzed. The missions 
were performed on shelf, shelf edge and on deep ocean. For different scenario, they 
were calculated medium endurance times and probabilities of survive based on Kaplan-Maier 
Estimator. In the table 4.6 are presented obtained results. 
Table 4.6. Probability of survive for different areas of operation based on Kaplan-Maier Estimator 
a) Operation on shelf 
SHELF 54 missions 
    
Medium endurance 23.7 days 








Survival Probability of 
survive 
S(K)_0 32 7 1 0.143 0.857 0.86 
S(K)_1 45 6 1 0.167 0.833 0.71 
S(K)_2 58 5 1 0.2 0.8 0.57 
S(K)_3 107 4 1 0.25 0.75 0.43 
S(K)_4 130 3 1 0.333 0.667 0.29 





b) Operation on shelf edge  
SHELF EDGE 81 missions 
    medium endurance 28.6 days 












S(K)'_0 32 7 1 0.143 0.857 0.86 
S(K)'_1 45 6 1 0.1667 0.833 0.71 
S(K)'_2 94 5 1 0.2 0.8 0.57 
S(K)'_3 133 4 1 0.25 0.75 0.43 
S(K)'_4 213 3 1 0.333 0.667 0.29 
S(K)'_5 217 2 1 0.5 0.5 0.14 
c) Operation on deep ocean 
c) Deep ocean 70 missions 
    
medium endurance 24.1 days 












S(K)''_0 32 10 1 0.1 0.9 0.9 
S(K)''_1 51 9 1 0.111 0.888 0.8 
S(K)''_2 120 8 1 0.125 0.875 0.7 
S(K)''_3 159 7 1 0.143 0.857 0.6 
S(K)''_4 172 6 1 0.167 0.833 0.5 
S(K)''_5 186 5 1 0.2 0.8 0.4 
S(K)''_6 235 4 1 0.25 0.75 0.3 
S(K)''_7 248 3 1 0.333 0.666 0.2 
S(K)''_8 252 2 1 0.5 0.5 0.1 
S(K)''_9 375 1 1 1 0 0 
 (Source: Own calculations based on Kaplan-Maier estimator) 
 On diagram 4.4 is presented probability of survive for three different areas. 
The probability is the greatest for operation on deep ocean, but from the other side, the smallest 
possibility is for shallow water as a shelf. It can be seen that the most difficult and dangerous 
situation are met on coastal water and it can be caused because of big presence of human, 





Diag.4.4. Probability of survive for different areas of operation (Source: Own calculations based on Kaplan-
Maier estimator) 
4.2.3. Confidence level of failure on deep ocean 
 Based on definition, the confidence level of failure on deep ocean has been calculated. 
From table 4.1 the statistics have been taken which concerned the number of missions 
and medium endurance in days for deep ocean operations. To calculate confidence level it has 
to be known average, standard deviation and variance. The central limit theorem has been 
used. The calculated values and presented in table 4.7. 




Medium endurance  
in days (t) 
    Deviation (   ̅)  
1 
CNRS 2 32 64 62,2 
2 
CSIC 14 19 266 26,2 
3 
INOGS 1 13 13 123,5 
4 
AWIPM 8 69 552 2014,7 
5 
CDCEEPCO 10 13 130 123,5 
6 
UEA 1 49 49 619,3 
7 
IM 3 14 42 102,3 
8 
NATO 23 4 92 404,6 
9 
SAMS 2 123 246 9778,4 
10 
NERC 6 39 234 221,6 
 
   ∑    ̅=37,5  ̅        =24,1    1497,4; σ=38.7 




 They have been counted standard deviation and variance for two different averages: 
normal and weighted. The values of standard deviations ale very similar but the mean time 
to failure (endurance) is significantly different  ̅       days for normal average and  ̅       
for weighted. There have been selected three confidence levels: 99%, 95% and 90% for which 
significance level are 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 in order. In the table 4.8 they are presented 
confidence intervals for different confidence levels. 
Table 4.8. Confidence intervals for different confidence levels 
 
Confidence level  99 95 90 
 
Significance level % 1 5 10 
 
Significance level 0,01 0,05 0,1 
 
The quantile 2,33 1,64 1,28 
Normal average 
Lower limit (days) 9,0 17,4 21,8 
Upper limit (days) 66,0 57,6 53,2 
(Source: Own calculations) 
4.3. Analysis of navigational system 
4.3.1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis for navigational aspect  
This analysis is used to identify accidental events, which may occur and allow 
estimating severity of each action. Thanks to this method, the accidental events 
can be identified. It allows to focusing on important issues and then putting the aspects in more 
detailed analysis. Before main analysis by Human Reliability Method and by Event Tree 
Analysis, the PHA will be performed to assess the possibility events. 
In the table 4.9 are presented the results of performed Preliminary Hazard Analysis 








Table 4.9. Preliminary Hazard Analysis for navigational equipment
Freq-Frequency; Cons- Consequences; RPN-Risk Priority Number 
(Source: Own development) 
No. Hazard Cause Consequence Risk Risk Reducing measures 
Freq Cons RPN 
1 Vehicle is not correctly monitored 
during mission 
Fatigue of crew, lack of 
knowledge 
Loss of glider, mission abort 2 4 8 Better control, training of crew 
2 Damage of navigational 
equipment not detected during 
preparation for mission 
Poor procedures, fatigue of 
crew, undetectable faults 
Unexpected glider behavior, 
loss of glider, mission abort  
1 4 4 Validate programming, training of 
crew, preparation conducted by 
specified procedures 
3 Wrong implementation of mission 
plan (wrong programming) 
Short time, fatigue of crew, 
unclear procedures 
No collection of data, mission 
abort , Loss of glider 
4 3 12 Validate programming, specified 
procedures, training of crew 
4 Low battery, insufficiently charged Lack of time, fatigue of crew Mission abort, no collation of 
data 
2 3 6 Specified procedures, training of 
crew, charge recommendation 
5 Faults of equipment  not solved 
before mission 
Few experience, undetectable 
faults, fatigue of crew, 
negligence of crew 
Unexpected glider behavior, 
loss of glider, mission abort 
2 4 8 Better control of equipment, training 
of crew, regular inspection, 
elimination of faults 
6 Unexpected behavior is not 
identified 
Few experience, fatigue of crew, 
bad knowledge, lack of time 
Loss of glider, mission abort, 
grounding,  
2 4 8 Training of crew, specified 
procedures, careful control 
7 Wrongly implemented parameters Short time, fatigue of crew, 
misunderstanding between crew 
No collection of data, mission 
abort, loss of glider 
3 4 12 Monitoring after and during mission, 
validate programming, training of 
crew 
8 Wrong use of software‘s Lack of procedures, 
misunderstand of programming 
Unexpected behavior of 
glider, mission abort 
3 2 6 Check software‘s, training of crew 
9 Damage of navigational 
equipment not detected (action) 
Fatigue of crew, undetectable 
faults 
Unexpected behavior, loss of 
glider, no collection of data 
2 4 8 Better control, training of crew, 
better monitoring of equipment 
10 Excessive currents, tides and 
waves not considered 
Lack of experience, negligence 
of crew 
Grounding,  unexpected 
behavior, mission abort 





4.3.2. Human Reliability Assessment and Event Tree Analysis 
To perform a Human Reliability Assessment, the events which may happen related 
to navigation system of Seaglider have to be identified. This step was performed using 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis. The next step is to assess the Human Reliability using SPAR-H 
method. The results are presented in table 4.10. 
Table 4.10. Results of Human Reliability Assessment for navigational aspect 
No. EVENT Description HRA 
1 CM (action) Glider is not correctly monitored by crew during mission 0.02 
2 DN (diagnosis) Damage of navigational equipment not detected during 
preparation for mission 
0.005 
3 WI (diagnosis) Wrong implementation of mission plan (wrong 
programming) 
0.016 
4 LB (diagnosis) Low battery, insufficiently charged  0.001 
5 FE (diagnosis) Faults of equipment were not solves before mission 0.1 
6 UB (diagnosis and 
action) 
Unexpected behavior is not identified 0.256 
7 WP (diagnosis) Wrongly implemented parameters 0.01 
8 WS (diagnosis) Wrong use of software‘s  0.01 
9 DE (diagnosis and 
action) 
Damage of navigational equipment not detected 0.242 
10 CW (diagnosis and 
action) 
Excessive currents, tides and waves not considered 0.181 
(Source: Own development)  
Using theory about Human Reliability Assessment, it is possible to calculate possibility 
of preceding events. In the table 4.11 is presented the manner of calculation on the example 
of damage of navigational equipment not detected. The calculations of Human Reliability 
for all events in aspects of navigation are in table 4.13.  
Table 4.11. PSFs for mission damage of navigational equipment not detected (diagnosis) 
No. PSFs PSF Level Multiplier  
 
Reason 
1 Available time Nominal time 1 The crew has sufficient time to study the 
device 
2 Stress/Stressors Nominal 1 Normal function, the lack of stressful factors, 
normal procedures 
3 Complexity Moderate 
complex 
2 Damage may not be noticed during routine 
check, imperceptible damage 
4 Experience, 
training 
High 0.5 The personnel is good prepared 
5 Procedures Insufficient 
Information 
1 Lack of information. But normally personnel 
is good instructed 
6 Ergonomics Poor 10 The control performed at the sea 
7 Fitness for duty Nominal 1 Operating crew with adequate knowledge 
8 Work process Good 0,5 Specific crew 




 If all PFS are nominal then the human error probability (in case of diagnostic) is equal 
0.01. In this case the PSFs have different values. The diagnosis failure probability in this case 
is equal: 
                                    
 The evaluation of PSFs for the action of the task will be different. The active Failure 
Probability will be equal: 
                                     
The probability without formal dependency is calculated as: 
                                
 In the case of dependency, special table has to be taken into account, which 
is formulated and presented in table 4.12. 
Table 4.12. Dependency Condition Table 
(Source: [30]) 
 Using this table the dependency condition can be assessing. In the case of damage 
of navigational equipment not detected, the dependency between diagnosis and action 
is moderate. The assumption is that the personnel is the same (situation is on vessel board), 
the time is not close in time, and location is different (Seaglider work under the water) 
and the cause is no additional. Under the table is presented how to calculate Task Failure 




     
         
 
       
 After Human Reliability Assessment, the Event Tree Analysis can be performed. 
As an initial event the damage of navigational equipment was selected. In tab 4.13 the detailed 
analysis of Human Error Probability is presented. On the figure 4.1 performed Event Tree 
Analysis for initiation event damage of navigational equipment not detected is presented. 
Table 4.13. Detailed Human Error Probability Analysis for navigational aspects 
 
Abb- abbreviation; PSFs- Performance Shaping factors; HEP-Human Error Probability;  T-time; S-Stress; 
C-complexity; E- experience; P procedures; E-ergonomic; FfD-fitness for duty;  W.P- Work Process; Cr-
crew; Ti-time; L- location; Ca-Cues; Dep-dependency; 
(Source: Own development) 
 
T S C E P Er FfD WP Cr Ti L Ca De
- - - - - - - - -
10 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.02
1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.005
- - - - - - - - -
1 2 2 1 0.5 1 1 0.8 0.016
- - - - - - - - -
0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.001
- - - - - - - - -
1 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.1
- - - - - - - - -
1 1 2 1 5 1 1 1 0.1
10 2 2 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.032
1 1 2 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.01
- - - - - - - - -
1 1 2 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.01
- - - - - - - - -
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.016
10 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.1
1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.8 0.004
10 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.04
mod 0.242
CW 0.044 s nc d na mod 0.181
DE 0.116 s nc d na
- 0.01
WS 0.01 - - - - - 0.01
WP 0.01 - - - -
- 0.1
UB 0.132 s nc d na mod 0.256
FE 0.1 - - - -
- 0.016
LB 0.001 - - - - - 0.001
WI 0.016 - - - -
- 0.02
DN 0.005 - - - - - 0.005











Fig.4.1. Event tree analysis for navigational aspect (Own development) 
 As an initiating event, the damage of navigational equipment not detected has been 
selected. If the crew does not detect the damage, it can cause that failures will not be solved 
before mission. The vehicle is not correctly monitored during mission what can cause 
unexpected behavior is not detected. The entire events are based on the Human Reliability 
Error Assessment. 
4.4. Analysis of risk for launching and recovering process 
4.4.1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis for failure 
 This analysis is used to identify accidental events, which may occur and allow 
estimating severity of each action. Before main analysis by Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree 
Analysis, the PHA will be performed to assess the possibility events. For launching process, 
the detailed analysis is presented in Attachment A, The results of Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
for launching process, and for recovering process in Attachment C, The results of Preliminary 








4.4.2. Human Reliability Assessment and Fault Tree Analysis  
To perform a Human Reliability Assessment, the events related to launching which may 
happen, have to be identified. This step was performed using Preliminary Hazard Analysis, 
and results are in Attachment A, The results of Preliminary Hazard for launching process. 
The next step is to assess the Human Reliability using SPAR-H method. The results 
are presented in the table 4.14. The calculations for particular events are 
in Attachment B Detailed HRA, summary for launching process. 
Table 4.14. Events and values of human probability calculated by SPAR-H method 
No. Event Description HRA 
1 WD (diagnosis) Wrong density used 0.00125 
2 WC (diagnosis) Wrong calculations 0.00250 
3 PC (diagnosis) Payload configuration error 0.00625 
4 WS (diagnosis) Wrong parameters implemented 0.001250 
5 EE (diagnosis and action) Error of equipment not detected 0.237 
6 SU (diagnosis) Glider is not set up physically correctly to 
launching 
0.02 
7 WB (diagnosis) Glider is wrongly ballasted for launching 0.0025 
8 PI (action) Glider position is inappropriate 0.01 
9 DT (diagnosis) Glider is damage during transport to 
launching location 
0.05 
10 DL (action) Glider is dropped during launching 0.025 
11 SE(diagnosis and action) Software error not detected 0.1536 
(Source: Own development) 
On the figure 4.2 is presented Fault Tree Analyse. The top event is failure during 
launching. As a reasons for failures have been selected for main causes: gilder is damage, error 
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4.4.3. Human Reliability Assessment and Event Tree Analysis  
To perform a Human Reliability Assessment, the events related to recovering which 
may happen, have to be identified. This step was performed using Preliminary Hazard Analysis, 
which results are presented in Attachment C, The results of Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
for recovering process. The next step is to assess the Human Reliability using SPAR-H method. 
The results are presented in the table 4.15. The calculations for particular events 
are in Attachment D, Detailed HRA, summary for launching process. 
Table 4.15. The Human Reliability Assessment for recovering process 
No. Event Description HRA 
1 CC (diagnosis) Current not considered 0.01 
2 SB (action) Hit the ship board 0.01 
3 DW (diagnosis) Difficult weather conditions not considered (high wave) 0.02 
4 EE (action and diagnosis) Error of equipment not detected 0.229 
5 GB (diagnosis) Glider is wrong ballasted 0.0005 
6 UH (diagnosis) Unexpected high tide 0.01 
7 WA (diagnosis) Wrong calculations 0.01 
8 IP (action) Inappropriate position of vessel 0.16 
9 LD (action) Lifting devices inappropriate prepared 0.02 
(Source: Own development) 
 The figure 4.3 presents the performed Event Tree Analysis. As the initiation event have 
been selected wrong calculations. From this event, the future scenarios have been evaluated. 
 




4.5. What-if Analysis for moving process 
 The gliders have a cigar shaped body to reduce the drag and obtain better efficiencies. 
The UUVs type gliders are buoyancy driven version, which can sinks and rise. It uses the small 
changes in its buoyancy together with wings to precede vertical motion to horizontal. Thanks 
of that the vehicle propel itself to forward with low power consumption. It is not so fast like other 
UUV but thanks of buoyancy-based propulsion, it has a significant bigger range and duration 
of operation. Seaglider follows saw-tooth pattern up –and-down through the water. The vertical 
pitch and roll are controlled by movable internal ballast (by battery packs).  
 The What-if analysis has been performed for UUV Seaglider in aspect of moving 
system. The results of the analysis are in the table 4.16. 
Table 4.16. The results of What-if Analysis. 
 




What If? Answer Likelihood Severity Recommendations
1. The battery is not charged?
1.Problems during mission, 
mission will be abort
 1. Quite 1.Minor
1. Check correctly before 
mission
2. The battery is broken?
2. Problems during 
missions, mission will be 
abort 
2.  Remote 2. Moderate
2. Check correctly before 
mission, constant control 
during mission
3. The buoyancy control 
system is not working 
correctly?
3. Problems with driving the 
glider, uncontrolled moves of 
vehicle
3. Very Unlikely 3. Critical
3.Train personnel, check 
before mission
4. The high-pressure pump is 
not working correctly?
4. Abort the mission or lost 
the vehicle
4. Very unlikely 4.Critical
4.Train personnel, constant 
monitoring
5. The electronics are not 
working correctly?
5.Other devices do not 
working correctly, broken 
controls, wrong readings
5. Very unlikely 5.Catastrophic
5. Advanced method of 
verification
6. Wrong powered the 
batteries?
6.Failure of other controls 6.Remote 6.Minor
6. Train personnel, check 
correctly
7. The buoyancy system is 
broken?
7.Problems during mission, 
mission will be abort or loss 
of the vehicle
7.Very unlikely 7.Catastrophic
7.Constantly checked during 
mission, train personnel 
prepared check list
8. The wings are broken?
8. Unexpected moving of 
vehicle, loss of glider
8. Very unlikely 8.Catastrophic
8.Check before mission, 
appropriate care of vehicle




5. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS   
5.1. Evaluation of Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
 Based on Preliminary Hazard Analysis, which was performed in chapter 4.2.1, 
the acceptability of the risks and analysis of results can be performed. Fourteen events have 
been selected, for which the probability and severity have been assumed. Based on Risk 
Priority Number, each of situation consist of two products, one is the probability (likelihood) 
and second is the severity (occurrence). The multiplication of this two products, assume 
the Risk Priority Number, which can access the acceptability of the risks. 
Table 5.1. Assessment of Risk Priority Number for Events in Coastal Waters 
Ref. Hazard Probability Severity RPN 
1 Collision with vessel 2 5 10 
2 Collision with other UUV 1 4 5 
3 Getting stuck in net 2 3 6 
4 Getting stuck in ice 2 3 6 
5 Pushed by strong current 1 2 2 
6 Pushed by high tide 1 1 1 
7 Collision with wrack 2 5 10 
8 Grounding 3 3 9 
9 Collision with marine infrastructure 3 4 12 
10 The human activity 4 1 4 
11 Collision with the anchor chain 1 3 3 
12 Hit during recovering 2 5 10 
13 Loss of vehicle 1 5 5 
14 Problems during launching 2 4 8 
(Source: Own development) 
 The biggest Risk Priority numbers have following events: collision with marine 
infrastructure (      ), collision with vessel (      ), collision with wrack (      ), 
hit during recovering (      ) and grounding (     ). These situations are the most 
demanding because they can cause the loss of the Seaglider. In the port area are many 
activities like vessel traffic, human activity, fishing boat and nets. Based on the RPN, none 
of this situation is unacceptable, but for some of them, the ALARP is needed. The ALARP 
is needed for events like: collision with the vessel, collision with other UUV, getting stuck in net, 
getting stuck in ice, collision with wrack, grounding, collision with marine infrastructure, hit 
during recovering and problems during launching.  
 The ALARP means- as low as reasonable practicable, which means: 
“To reduce a risk to a level which is „as low as reasonably practicable‟ involves balancing 




the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction 
measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained”
14
. 
Coastal areas like ports are the most demanding for vehicles like autonomous 
underwater vehicles. To the most dangerous can be counted: collision with vessel, with wrack, 
with marine infrastructure and hit during recovering. These hazard were considered as the most 
dangerous because can cause big loss, like the failure of equipment and even loss 
of vehicle. To less risky are: pushed by strong current or high tide and the human activity. 
In port of Gdynia, according to information in Admiralty Sailing Directions [29] there is a weak 
N current set off the entrance to Gdynia Harbor. The Baltic Sea is non-tidal area, so the risk 
of pushing by high tidal is very small. 
 The greatest possibility of occur have following hazards like: grounding, collision 
with marine infrastructure and human activity. The harbor area is shallow and the Port of Gdynia 
has only 14 meters of depth, what makes that is a very shallow area. The harbor 
due to the large movement of vessel has to be marked well and this cause a large number 
of different infrastructures like: breakwaters, buoys, light vessels etc. In addition, in the port 
are performed many different tasks concerning with infrastructure, cargo transferring, dredging 
the port which is connected with human activity.   
5.2. Assessment of area of operation based on Kaplan Maier estimator  
The data to perform analysis based on area of operation were taken from Project 
GROOM data base. In this project area of operation was divided into three main groups: shelf, 
shelf edge and deep ocean. The information about the number of missions, vehicles used 
and aborts have been presented in chapter 4.1 of this work. 
 
Diag.5.1. Probability of survive for different areas of operation, (a-shelf and b-deep ocean) (Source: [29]) 
Three different regions of operations were analyzed. The missions were performed 
on shelf, shelf edge and on deep ocean. For different scenarios, were calculated medium 
endurance time and probability of survive based on Kaplan-Maier estimator. Based on the data 
from the from GROOM project, it can be noticed that reliability of the system is higher 
                                               
14
OGP Report No. 6.36/210, Guidelines for the Development and Application of Health, Safety and 




for missions performed on deep seas than on self or shelf edge. The reliability of the system 
for approximately 100 days of work for deep ocean is 0.7 but for shelf edge is 0.57 and for shelf 
is 0.43. 
On the diagram 5.1 are presented probability of survive for two areas: shelf and deep 
ocean performed by M. Brito, D.Smeed and G. Griffiths [8]. The probability is greater 
for operation on deep sea, and smallest for shallow water as a shelf. Comparing with the results 
from chapter 4.2.2 it can be noted that obtained results are very similar. It can be seen 
that the most difficult and dangerous situation are met on coastal water and it can be caused 
by big presence of human, the marine infrastructure, pipelines, other vessel etc. 
In recent years, a lot of approaches have been made to quantify the ongoing risk 
of vehicles which operate on different scenarios [24]. Coastal surveys have been recognized 
and different scenarios have been studies. The surveyors provide probability of survival in most 
challenging setups (coastal waters) between 0.97 and 0.99 for mission ranges below 30 km 
[24]. Coastal water is the most demanding scenario for vehicles, because the potential risks 
are numerous, for example: environmental hazards, man-made structures, human activity etc. 
The frequency of such episodes is high and they can be occurred at the same time [12].  
Engineers have been trying to approach to the problem of risk assessment. The most 
critical phases of operations are launching and recovering of device. This assumption is true 
but especially for deep ocean vehicles because they operate in quit calm environment. 
Regarding to vehicles which are used in shallow water, near the shore, the most dangerous 
are uncharted obstacles or vessel traffic especially intensive in port area [24]. 
5.3. Analysis of confidence level of failure on deep ocean. 
 Based on definition, the confidence level of failure on deep ocean was calculated. 
The medium endurance time in days was calculated in two ways, using to different averages: 
normal and weighted. For the weighted average, the numbers of deep ocean mission were 
taken as weights. The medium endurance days for deep ocean missions are: 
 ̅                  
 ̅                 
The standard deviation is σ= 38.7days and the variance is   = 1497.4        
From the subsequent calculations, it can be noted that values of mean time of failure 
(endurance) does not have a normal distribution, but according to central limit theorem, it have 
to be assumed that the MTTF has normal (Gaussian) distribution. There have been selected 
three confidence levels: 99%, 95% and 90%, for which significance level are 0.01, 0.05 







Table 5.2. Confidence intervals for different confidence levels 
 
Confidence level  99 95 90 
 
Significance level % 1 5 10 
 
Significance level 0,01 0,05 0,1 
 
The quantile 2,33 1,64 1,28 
Normal average 
Lower limit (days) 9,0 17,4 21,8 
Upper limit (days) 66,0 57,6 53,2 
(Source: Own calculations) 
 For the weighted average, the lower limit of interval for level 99% is -2,4 days what 
is incorrect because failure cannot occur before the start of operation. The more accurate 
results are for normal average. For two different situations, were calculated probability density 
functions of failure on deep sea using following expression 5.1: 
 ( )  
 
 √  
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)                                                   (   ) 
On the diagram 5.2 are presented probability density functions calculated using above 
formula. As can be seen, the mean time to failure in this case does not have normal distribution, 
but according to central limit theorem it must be established. 
 
Diag.5.2. Probability density functions of failure on deep ocean 
“The probability density function is nonnegative everywhere, and its integral over 
the entire space is equal to one”
15
. The integral of the probability density function in this case 
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is not equal one, what can be noted from diagram. On the diagram 5.2 has been marked 
confidence interval for confidence level of 95%. The confidence interval 
is                       . It can be stated that failure will occur with 95% certainly between 
     and      day of operation.  It has to be taken into account that in industry 
are a lot of different types of gliders. The above statistics are huge averaging because 
of different areas of operations of this vehicle, quality of equipment, and age of vehicles which 
effect on accuracy of results. It has to be noted that the medium time of operation is          , 
which is the long period if we compare it with operation of UUVs [38]. 
5.4. Evaluation of risk assessment for navigational aspect 
5.4.1. Evaluation of Preliminary Hazard Analysis for navigational equipment 
 This analysis is used to identify accidental events, which may occur and allow 
estimating severity of each action. Before main analysis by Event Tree method, the PHA will 
be performed to assess the possibility events. In chapter 4.3.1 are presented detailed analysis 
which is shorted in table 5.3. The multiplication of two products: the frequency 
and the consequences assume the Risk Priority Number, which can access the acceptability 
of the risk. 
Table 5.3. Assessment of frequency and consequence for different events 
EVENT Risk RPN 
Frequency Consequence 
CM  2 8 8 
DN  1 4 4 
WI  4 3 12 
LB  2 3 6 
FE  2 4 8 
UB  2 4 8 
WP  3 4 12 
WS  3 2 6 
DE  2 4 8 
CW  1 3 3 
 (Source: Own development) 
 The biggest Risk Priority Numbers have following events: 
 WI: Wrong implementation of mission plan, wrong programming (      ) 
 WP: Wrongly implemented parameters (      ) 
 These situations are most demanding because can occur very frequently. The wrong 
implementation parameters and mission plan is caused by human negligence and provoke 
the abort of the mission, loss of data or loss of the vehicle. Based on the RPN, none 
of this situation is unacceptable, but for some the ALARP is needed. The acceptability 




 The risk is acceptable for following events: damage of navigational equipment 
not detected during preparation for mission (     ) and excessive currents, tides and waves 
not considered (     ).These situations are the least demanding because the frequency 
of these events is very low. It was assumed that the personnel are good prepared for the job, 
and the routine actions are performed well. 
5.4.2. Analysis of Human Reliability Assessment for navigational system 
 The Human Reliability Assessment was performed using method called SPAR-H. 
The results were presented in table 4.10 in chapter 4.3.2 and the more specified calculation 
of Human Error Probability are in table 4.13. From this analysis, the following conclusions may 
be drawn: 
 „Unexpected behavior is not identified‖ has the human reliability equal to 0.256. 
This event has the biggest value of this indicator. The reason is that this event 
is connected with action and diagnosis, what cause that the reliability has higher value 
compared with events which take place only in diagnosis. 
 ―Damage of navigational equipment not detected‖ also has human reliability high 
and equal to 0.242. The reason is like in the previous assessment. 
 ―Damages and unexpected behaviors‖ are very stressful for crew members, and also 
the available time is shorted to detected this failures and repair it. 
 The lowest value has ―Low battery, insufficient charged‖. The crew has a long available 
time, and this event is not so stressful, and procedures are good prepared. 
 The assumption was that the crew is good prepared for the work (PSF- experience, 
training, and fitness for duty), the main factors which effects on Human Error Probability 
have been the availability time, stressors and complexity of the task. 
5.4.3. Analysis of the result of the Event Tree analysis for navigational system 
 Based on Human Reliability Assessment, The Event Tree was created. The initiating 
event was ―damage of navigational equipment not detected‖. The outcomes and subsequent 
event were analyzed. The subsequent events were: 
 Faults of equipment were not solved before mission,  (  )      
 Glider is not correctly monitored by crew during mission,  (  )        
 Unexpected behavior is not identified by crew,  (  )        
Three outcomes were found: Mission delayed with probability 0.2178, Mission abort 
with probability 0.02456, Loss of vehicle with probability 0.00012. 
 As can be noted, the probabilities are very small. If the damage of navigational 
equipment will not be detected, the most likely is mission delayed with probability 0.2178.  




and Seaglider will not be corrected monitored and behavior will not be identified, them this can 
cause loss of the vehicle. 
5.5. Analysis of launching and recovering process 
5.5.1. Evaluation of Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
 The Preliminary Hazard Analysis was performed to identify events, which may occur 
and allow estimating severity and consequences of each action. In table 5.4 are presented 
the results of Preliminary Hazard Analysis for launching and recovery.  
Table 5.4. Preliminary Hazard Analysis and Risk Priority Number 
a) Launching process 
No. Abb. Hazard Risk 
Freq Cons RPN 
1 WD Wrong density used 2 2 4 
2 WC Wrong calculations 1 3 3 
3 PC Payload configuration error 1 4 4 
4 WS Wrong parameters implemented 3 2 6 
5 EE Error of equipment not detected 2 4 8 
6 SU Glider is not set up physically correctly to launching 2 4 8 
7 WB Glider is wrongly ballasted for launching 2 3 6 
8 PI Glider position is inappropriate 3 4 12 
9 DT Glider is damage during transport to launching location 2 4 8 
10 DL Glider is dropped during launching 1 5 5 
11 SE Software error not detected 1 3 3 
b) Recovering process 
No. Abb. Hazard Risk 
Freq Cons PRN 
1 CC  Current not considered 2 2 4 
2 SB  Hit the ship board 3 5 15 
3 DW  Difficult weather conditions not considered (high wave) 2 4 8 
4 EE  Error of equipment not detected 2 5 10 
5 GB  Glider is wrong ballasted 1 5 5 
6 UH  Unexpected high tide 2 1 2 
7 WA  Wrong calculations 2 4 8 
8 IP  Inappropriate position of vessel 2 5 10 
9 LD  Lifting devices inappropriate prepared 2 4 8 




 For launching process, the events with the higher Risk Priority Number are: glider 
position is inappropriate (      ), error equipment not detected (     ), glider 
is not set up physically correctly to launching (     ) and glider is damage during transport 
to launching location (     ). These events are the most demanding because they have 
the biggest consequences, and can cause failure of the equipment or even the loss 
of it. Inappropriate position of glider and inappropriate physically set up, can cause its damage 
and even loss. When the error of equipment is not detected early it can cause the impossible 
process of launching and unexpected behaviour of glider, which can cause the elongation 
of the launching process. The risk is acceptable for following events (where      ): wrong 
density used (     ), wrong calculations (     ), payload configuration error (     ) 
and software error not detected (     ). None of the events are unacceptable but for some 
of these the ALARP is needed. 
 For recovering process, the events with the higher Risk Priority Number are: hit the ship 
(      ), error of equipment not detected (      ) and inappropriate position of the vessel 
(      ). First event is the most dangerous because can cause the loss of vehicle. When the 
glider hit the ship board it can damage itself seriously and be impossible to recovering. 
Additionally it can cause the damage of ship sides. When the error of equipment is not detected 
early it can cause the impossible process of recovering or elongation of it. The consequences 
of these situations are high, but the assumption is that the crew is good prepared for work, 
and the frequency of this situation is low.  
 The risk is acceptable for following events: current not considered (     ), 
and unexpected high tide (     ). The unexpected high tide it does not cause the threats 
during recovering. The tides have only impact in shallow water, because can cause 
the grounding of the equipment (the depth is lower/higher than expected). The current is taking 
into account by glider system so it is able to set up according to current.  
5.5.2. Human Probability Assessment and Fault Tree for launching process 
 The Human Reliability Assessment was performed used SPAR-H method. 
The calculations for particular events are presented in Attachment B, Detailed HRA, summary 
for launching process. The events with the highest probability of occur are: error of equipment 
not detected (         ), software error not detected (          ) and glider is damage 
during transport to launching location (        )  The high value for two first events is due 
to the fact that these events are possible during diagnosis and action. The lover probability 
has the following events: wrong parameters implemented (           ), wrong density used 
(           ), wrong calculations (          ) and glider is wrongly ballasted 
for launching (          ). 
 The Fault Tree Analysis was performed. The top event was ―failure during launching‖. 
There were selected four mean reasons of it: glider is damage (      )  Error of equipment 




calculations (      )  The analysis was performed based on assumption that the top event 
has to have probability equal to one (main foundation of Fault Tree Analysis). The bottom 
events in this case have to have sum of probability equal to one.  
5.5.3. Human Probability Assessment and Event Tree for recovering process 
To perform a Human Reliability Assessment, the events related to recovering which 
may happen, have to be identified. This step was performed using Preliminary Hazard Analysis. 
The next step is to assess the Human Reliability using SPAR-H method. The calculations 
for particular events are in Attachment D, Detailed HRA, summary for recovering process. 
The event with the higher Human Error Probability is error of equipment not detected. 
The first reason is that this event can cause during the diagnosis and action. The dependency 
cause that the probability is higher than for other events. The next event is inappropriate 
position of vessel ( (  )      ). This situation is very stressful for crew, because can cause 
impossibility of recovering of vehicle. In case of bad weather condition, the setting of the ship 
can last long, causing fatigue and stress of crew. 
The lowest probability equal to       has the scenario: glider is wrong ballasted. 
The vehicle is suited with many controls and advanced systems which provide high reliability 
of vehicle. The situations like current not considered, hit the ship side, unexpected high tide 
and wrong calculations have low probability of occurrence, but it has to be remember that they 
can cause a very risky situation. A good example is presented in performed Event Tree 
Analysis. As the initiation event are wrong calculations, which can cause that current will 
not be consider. The current not considered seems to be not so dangerous for equipment 
and crew, but can cause that crew set up inappropriate position of vessel. If this error 
is not detected, the vehicle can hit the ship board and can cause loss of vehicle. 




6. EVALUATION OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE RISK 
The risk acceptance must be defined as ―safety for defined scenario, but is a complex 
and controversial task‖ 
16
. In the industry is a several methods, which have been developed 
to help in determining the acceptability of the risk, which will be discuss in this chapter. 
The acceptance criteria are the standards, which help to perform decision making during 
the evaluation phase of analysis. The evaluated risk have to be compared with risk criteria (with 
the specified level of acceptance and tolerance) to determine the ability of accept. The methods 
are briefly summarized in the table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Methods used to determine Risk Acceptance 
Risk Acceptance Method Summary 
Risk Priority Number Method design for risk analysis method Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis. It multiple assigned probability and severity. 
Farmer Curve It is an estimated curve which demonstrates graphically the region 
of risk acceptance or no acceptance.  
Revealed Preference Comparison of risks and benefits for different events, categorized in 
voluntary and involuntary expose to risk 
Evaluate Magnitude of 
Consequences 
Compares the likelihood and consequence magnitude of the risk. It 
is used to determine acceptable level risk based on consequences 
Cost Effectiveness of Risk 
Reduction 
Ratio for comparing cost to the magnitude of risk reduction 
Risk Comparison Best suited to comparing risks of the same type. Compare various 
industries, activities. 
(Source: [2]) 
6.1. Risk priority number 
 Risk priority number or RPN: “is a numeric assessment or risk assigned to a process, 
or steps in a process, as part of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, in which a team assigns 
each failure mode numeric values that quantify likelihood of occurrence, likelihood of detection 
and severity of impact”
17
.  
This method is especially design for risk analysis method Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis. It can be however used after other analysis. It is very common approach in which 
team members multiply the assigned probability of occurrence (O) and severity (S). The Product 
of these two values is the risk Priority Number is presented by formula 6.1 [40]. 
                                                                               (6.1) 
 In FMEA method, the likelihood of detection is taken into consideration. 
When the detection is included in analysis, the Risk Priority Number is the product 
of occurrence, severity and detection, formula 6.2. 
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                                                                           (   ) 
The acceptability of the risk is based on the pre-established values of RPN. In the case 
if occurrence and severity was taken into consideration (two products), the values can 
be as follows: 
         the risk is acceptable 
      , but         , the investigation should be perform to reduce the risk 
and implement risk controls (for example ALARP) 
       , the risk is unacceptable, the changes in design are required to mitigate 
the risk 
The result of this analysis is the risk evaluation matrix, which show, which of events 





Fig.6.1. Risk Matrix to calculate Risk Priority Number (Source: [40]) 
The pattern is symmetrically because Occurrence and Severity in this case have 
the same weight. The manufacturers have not been not agree with this assumption 
that occurrence have the same weight as severity, because the risk with high severity are more 
important than the risks with high occurrence. As the result, they used asymmetrical matrices, 
to better expose their tolerance for risk [40]. 
6.2. Method of acceptability of risk for owners 
 G.Griffiths and A. Trembanis proposed how the owners of AUVs (but can be also used 
to other types of UUV) can decide about the acceptable level of risk based on the costs [13]. 
This approach can be illustrated by following figure 6.2. This process consists of eight main 
steps which are: 
1. Establish the capital cost of the vehicle C. It can be cost of build but also cost of purchase 
or cost of replace. 
2. Identify the typical daily cost of operation D. The cost can be varied depend on the type 
of campaign, the technical support requirements, the part of charter rate, the cost of science 
team and etc. 
3. State the fraction of the daily rate D they are agree to accept as a loss substitution fee 
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4. Calculate the required service life (in days) by formula 6.3: 
      
 
 
   ,    -                                                            (   ) 
5. Assign the relative risks R and subsets S. They have to be recognized varying risks through 
vehicle service life (which is split into n user subsets). Each one of subset  , has    days 
and relative assessment risk    . 
6. Declaration of the minimum acceptable probability K.  
7. From previous assumption, the hazard rate can be calculated by formula 6.4: 
   
  ( )
∑     
 
   
                                                                         (   ) 
8. Calculation of acceptability of loss for a campaign of m subsets (y days) of activities   , each 
one with risk factor   , from equation 6.5. 
  ∑  
 
   
                                                                             (   ) 
And the probability of loss is calculated from equation 6.6. 
 (    )        (   ∑     )                                                 (   )
 
   
 
 On the table 6.2 is presented spreadsheet which can be used by the owners to take 
decision about acceptability of the risk. The spread sheet was created based on the above 
formulas. 
 







Table 6.2. Spreadsheet for owners to calculate acceptability of the risk 
Owner initial Inputs 
UUV Capital Cost (C) 180000 Euros 
Replacement cost charge (x%) 20 % of daily operations cost 




Cost of Daily operations 
Direct  UUV charge 400 Euros per day 
Fraction science team 1000 Euros per day 
Fraction of ship 2000 Euros per day 
Daily cost of operation (D) 3400 Euros per day 
Risk subsets % Service life Relative risk Days 
Open water 50 1 132 
Shelf water 40 3 106 
Under shelf ice 10 10 26 
Other subset … … … 
Calculated parameters 
Required service life (S) 265 operational days   
Replacement cost charge 680 euro per day   
Hazard rate  λ  0.002654407 per day   
Campaign details 
Number of service days 15 days   
Risk subsets % campaign Relative risk Days 
Open water 10 1 1.5 
Shelf water 30 3 4.5 
Under shelf ice 60 10 9 
Other subset … … … 




   (Source: Own development based on [13]) 
 In the grey boxes are parameters which can be changed by the owner to obtain 








6.3. Farmer Curve’s 
 The curve was introduced by Frank Reginald Farmer. He had worked in the nuclear 
branch and he had postulated that whole spectrum of events which have to be considered, 
not only the maximum credible accident. Accidents which have fewer consequences which 
are more probable also have to be taken into consideration. This curve presents cumulative 
probability versus consequences [2]. This graph introduces a probabilistic approach in case 
of determination of acceptability safety limit. Probabilities values have to been calculated 
for each level of risk, thanks of that generate a unique curve for hazard of concern [2]. 
 
Fig.6.3. Farmer curve, Annual frequency of facilities from man-made structures, compared with risk profile 
of 100 operational nuclear plants (Source: [21]) 
  The horizontal axis can display the: ―number of facilities‖ or ―accident severity‖, 
on the other hand the vertical axis show complementary cumulative risk which is ―frequency 
of facilities exceeding x‖ [21]. The area on the right side, or ―outside‖ of the curve is consider 
as unacceptable for this hazard, because the risk and frequency are higher than estimated 
values by this curve. On the left side or ―inside‖ is consider as acceptable because the risk 
and frequency are less than average value of the curve [2]. When lines are intersecting 





6.4. Factors effecting on the acceptability of the risk 
6.4.1. Revealed Preferences method –benefit effect 
 The method of Revealed Preference associate the risk to benefit and them categorize 
different types of risk.  The main motivation for set this type of relation is obvious that the risk 
is not taken unless benefits not come and are high. The benefit can be determined by monetary 
value or by some other measurements of worth, for example pleasure or satisfaction [26]. 
On the figure 6.4 is plotted the risk relative to the benefit.  
 
Fig.6.4. Risk plotted relative to benefit, for various kinds of voluntary and involuntary exposure (Source: 
[26]) 
 This method assumed that the risk which can be accepted by society when 
is in equilibrium with benefits. As can be noted from the graph, there are two estimated lines 
which are divided into voluntary and involuntary risk categories. According to Starr (1969) [26]: 
―The acceptance of individual risk is an exponential function of the wage, and can be roughly 
approximated by a third-power relationship in this range”. This relationship between benefits 
and the risk can be formulates by formula 6.7 as: 





6.4.2. Evaluation of magnitude of risk consequence 
 Another factor which effects on the acceptability of the risk is the magnitude 
of the consequences of the incident what can cause some failure. Briefly summarizing, 
if the consequence is larger them the likelihood of the event has to be lower [47]. This method 
has been used in industry to illustrate the position of the industry within a society‘s risk 
acceptance levels based on the magnitude of the consequence, which can be shown by figure 
6.5. 
 
Fig.6.5. Target Risk Based on Consequence of Failure for Industries/Activities (Source: Whitman 1984) 
 Further evaluation has resulted in numerous estimates for relationship between 
magnitude of consequence for failure and the accepted probability of the failure. Two equations 
can be mentioned here, first one (equation 6.8) is the CIRIA (Construction Industry Research 
and Information Association): 




                                                                   (   ) 
Where:  
T- The life of the structure 
K- Factor regarding the redundancy of the structure 
n- Number of people exposed to risk 
Other estimation is known as Allen‘s estimation (1981) and is as follows, equation 6.9: 




                                                                  (   ) 
Where: 
A and W – The factors regarding the type and redundancy of the structure. 




6.4.3. Risk Reduction Cost Effectiveness Ratio 
This factor assesses the risk acceptance in the determination of risk effectiveness which 
can be formulated by equation 6.10 as [2]: 
                 
    
     
                                                   (    ) 
Where the cost should be ascribed to risk reduction and the       is the level of reduction 
of the risk, and can be formulated as equation 6.11: 
      (                            )  (                           )      (    ) 
 Risk effectiveness can be used to evaluate numerous risk reduction efforts. The most 
benefit of the cost can be achieved with the smallest risk effectiveness. This measurement 
can be used to determine the acceptability level of the risk. The inverse of this formula 
can express the cost effectiveness. The relationship can be illustrated by the graph, where 
the equilibrium between risk and cost is showed on following fig.6.6. The main question is which 
level of risk is acceptable (or replaced) and how much people are willing to pay to avoid a risk 
[18]. The trade-off point is consider where the 
  
  
 is equal -1. But to find this point and to draw 
this graph it is necessary to measure the cost and the risk in the same units for example dollars 
[18]. The decision based on cost- benefit consideration cannot be match with societal values 






Fig.6.6. Cost effectiveness of risk reduction (After Rowe, 1977) 
6.4.4. Risk Comparison 
The Risk Comparison method is the most common practise to evaluating the risk. This 
method uses the frequency of the consequences to compare the risks in different areas 
of interest [2]. The frequency of mortality, morbidity, damage compared between various 
activities, between countries, regions, cities, are compared to encourage some desired action 
[37]. 
This method is affective when the risk is compared in the same human consequences 
and perception (categories). When the comparison is performed between different categories, 
should be done very cautiously. One of the assumptions in this method is that the risks which 









 The thesis was purposed to present and analysed different method of risk analysis used 
in engineering, and found the appropriate method to analyse the complex system like Unnamed 
Underwater Vehicle type Seaglider. In the thesis have been listed and described several 
methods which are used in naval engineering and are opportunely to examine this system like: 
fault tree analysis, preliminary hazard analysis or what-if method. The risk analysis is quiet new 
branch of the engineering, which is not yet known well. On the other hand, nowadays more 
researched are performed to expand this field of science.  
 In the engineering, they can be found qualitative and quantitative methods of risk 
analysis. The choice depends on the results, which may be obtained, but also on the data that 
are available to analysis. In the first type of methods, the reason is to describe the risk by words 
by the following methods like: brainstorming, what-if or Preliminary Hazard Analysis. 
On the other hand, using qualitative methods is possible to obtain the numbers 
with will describe the risk (for example the probability of occurrence). The knowledge about 
different methods allow to selecting the appropriate one, to obtain the intended target. 
The different methods are used to different objectives, and allow to obtaining dissimilar effects. 
One of the limitations in the choice of the method is the held data and second one is the desired 
result. 
 The risk analysis methods, allow to checking before the launch of product, the weakest 
aspects of the system. They help to create a list of probably failures, which can help to note 
the most demanding parts of the system. Thanks of that, the operational team can create 
checklist, which allow to checking the parts of the object exposed to failure.  Good performed 
risk analysis allows focusing on defects of the system and allows repairing them. 
 The problem in some analysis can be the lack of the data and information 
about the system. To obtain some values like probability or frequency, the data is needed. 
The good source of data is historical data base, but not in all cases is available. An example 
can be the new and innovative device, which is not in the market. The analysis can be based 
on expert judgement, data base or on human reliability. In this thesis in some studies 
the Human Reliability Assessment was performed. This method is very useful if there 
is not enough data to perform other types of analysis. However, should be remembered 
that for good reliability assessment, person performing the analysis should has the experience 
and knowledge about the system and environment. Additionally, this technique was created 
for Nuclear Plants, what can cause some inaccuracies.  
 The risk analysis can be performed for every system in the nature. Additionally different 
aspects of system can be extracted on different pieces. For the UUV Seaglider were selected 
aspects like navigational equipment, area of operation or moving system. The UUV is the hard 
object to studies. Its environment is variable and not entirely explored. On the other hand, 
the object itself is not explored properly yet. A lot of companies try to improve these vehicles 




the system and the environment in which this system is moving. For this reason, 
the characterization of the object and environment should be performed. It allow to better 
understanding the vehicle and knowing its characteristic. 
 The risk analysis of the gliders presents that these devices are very durable 
and can work approximately 30 days. It is very long period of time if it is compared 
with endurance time of other vehicles, for example with autonomous underwater vehicles.  
Additionally, the analysis shows the weak points of these devices. The worst scenarios for these 
vehicles are shallow water like port area, because of human activity, marine infrastructure 
or vessel traffic. They are better suited to work on deep sea. On the other hand, for oceans 
the launching and recovering procedures is more demanding.  
 The risk analysis is better method to check the reliability of the system than trial 
and error method. This technique can save a lot of many for companies, because these 
vehicles are very expensive and the price is approximately 100,000 $.  
 Summarizing, the knowledge about risk analysis should be still expanded. It allows 
improving the existing devices but also to create and design more safety in the future. 
The UUVs have a lot of features, which can be improved and are the challenge 
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Attachment A The results of Preliminary Hazard Analysis for launching process 
No. Hazard Cause Consequences Risk Risk Reducing measures 
Freq Cons RPN 
1 Wrong density used Fatigue of crew, lack of experience Difficult launching, 2 2 4 Training of crew 
2 Wrong calculations Wrong parameters used, lack of 
experience and knowledge 
Unexpected Glider 
behaviour 
1 3 3 Training of crew 
3 Payload configuration error Lack of experience, lack of control and 
procedures 
Unexpected behaviour of 
glider 
1 4 4 Preparation conducted by specified 
procedures 
4 Wrong parameters 
implemented 




3 2 6 Training of crew 
5 Error of equipment not 
detected 
Inappropriate control, lack of 
procedures, negligence of crew 
Unexpected glider 
behaviour, mission abort, 
data not collected 
2 4 8 Specified procedures, better control of 
equipment, careful control 
6 Glider is not set up 
physically correctly to 
launching 
Lack of time, negligence of crew, lack 
of experience 
Difficult in launching, 
damage to Glider 
2 4 8 Training of crew, better control of 
equipment, better procedures 
7 Glider is wrongly ballasted 
for launching 
Lack of time, fatigue of crew, lack of 
experience and knowledge 
Difficult launching, 
unexpected behaviour 
2 3 6 Training of crew, validate 
programming 
8 Glider position is 
inappropriate 
Lack of experience and knowledge Difficult launching, damage 
to Glider 
3 4 12 Better control, specified procedures, 
training of crew 
9 Glider is damage Inappropriate treatment of vehicle Difficult launching, 
unexpected behaviour, 
loss of Glider 
1 4 4 Better control 
10 Glider is damage during 
transport to launching 
location 
Improper packing, improper stowage, 
imprudence, bad preparation 
Impossibility of launching, 
launching and mission 
abort  
2 4 8 Specified procedures 
11 Glider is dropped during 
launching 
Fatigue of crew, Imprudence, bad 
preparation 
Impossibility of launching, 
launching abort 
1 4 4 Specified procedures, training of crew, 
better control of equipment 
12 Software error not detected Lack of procedures, misunderstanding 
of program 
Unexpected behaviour, 
mission abort  








Attachment B Detailed HRA, summary for launching process 
 
Abb. PSFs HEP P_w Dependency P_w 
Time Stress Comp. Exp. Proced. Ergo. FfD W.Process Crew Time Local Cause Dep 
WD 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.00125 0.00125 - - - - - 0.00125 
- - - - - - - - - 
WC 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.0025 0.0025 - - - - - 0.0025 
- - - - - - - - - 
PC 1 1 1 0.5 5 0.5 1 0.5 0.00625 0.00625 - - - - - 0.00625 
- - - - - - - - - 
WS 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.00125 0.00125 - - - - - 0.00125 
- - - - - - - - - 
EE 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.01 0.11 s nc d na moderate 0.237 
10 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.1 
SU 1 2 2 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.02 0.02 - - - - - 0.02 
- - - - - - - - - 
WB 1 1 2 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.0025 0.0025 - - - - - 0.0025 
- - - - - - - - - 
PI - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.01 - - - - - 0.01 
10 2 2 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 - 
DT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.005 0.005 - - - - - 0.005 
- - - - - - - - - 
DL - - - - - - - - - 0.025 - - - - - 0.025 
10 5 2 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 0.025 
SE 1 1 2 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.0025 0.0125 s nc d na moderate 0.1536 
10 2 2 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 0.01 
Abb- abbreviation; PSFs- Performance Shaping factors; HEP-Human Error Probability; Comp-complexity; Exp- experience; Proced- procedures; Ergo-ergonomic; FfD-fitness 










Attachment C The results of Preliminary Hazard Analysis for recovering process 
No. Hazard Cause Consequences Risk Risk reducing measures 
Freq Cons PRN 
1 Current not considered Wrong parameters used, lack of 
experience 
Difficult recovering, unexpected 
behaviour, elongation of the 
process 
2 2 4 Better procedures and software‘s 
2 Hit the ship board Bad preparation process, lack of 
knowledge , inappropriate position 
of vessel 
Loss of equipment and data, 
damage of ship side 
3 5 15 Training of crew, better prepared 
devices and equipment 
3 Difficult weather 
conditions not 
considered (high wave) 
Lack of time and knowledge, 
negligence of crew 
Difficult recovering, damage of 
vehicle, loss of vehicle 
2 4 8 Training of crew, better preparation for 
mission 
4 Error of equipment not 
detected 
Inappropriate control, lack of 
procedures, negligence of crew 
Unexpected glider behaviour, 
loss of data, loss of equipment 
2 5 10 Specified procedures, better control of 
equipment, Carrefour control 
5 Glider is wrong 
ballasted 
Wrong parameters used, lack of 
knowledge and experience 
Difficult recovering, unexpected 
behaviour, hit the ship board 
1 4 4 Training for crew, specified procedures 
6 Unexpected high tide Wrong calculations, wrong 
parameters used, lack of experience 
Difficult recovering 2 1 2 Training of crew 
7 Wrong calculations Wrong parameters used, lack of 
experience and knowledge 
Unexpected behaviour, 
elongation of the process 
2 4 8 Better procedures, better preparation 
8 Inappropriate position 
of vessel 
Wrong preparation for recovering, 
wrong calculations, inappropriate 
preparation  
Damage of vehicle, loss of 
vehicle, loss of data 
2 5 10 Better procedures and preparation, 
training of crew  
9 Lifting devices 
inappropriate prepared 
Wrong preparation for process, lack 
of knowledge, human error 
Damage of vehicle, loss of 
vehicle 
2 4 8 Training of crew, better procedures and 




Attachment D Detailed HRA, summary for recovering process 
Abb. PSFs HEP P_w Dependency P_w 
Time Stress Comp. Exp. Proced. Ergo. FfD W.Process Crew Time Local Cause Dep 
CC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.01 0.01 - - - - - 0.01 
- - - - - - - - - 
SB - - - - - - - - - 0.01 - - - - - 0.01  
1 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.01 
DW 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.02 0.02 - - - - - 0.02 
- - - - - - - - - 
EE 1 1 0.1 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.0005 0.1005 s nc d na moderate 0.229 
10 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.1 
GB 1 1 0.1 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.0005 0.0005 - - - - - 0.0005 
- - - - - - - - - 
UH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.01 0.01 - - - - - 0.01 
- - - - - - - - - 
WA 1 2 2 1 5 1 1 1 0.2 0.01 - - - - - 0.2 
- - - - - - - - - 
IP - - - - - - - - - 0.16 - - - - - 0.16 
10 2 2 1 5 1 1 0.8 0.16 
LD - - - - - - - - - 0.02 - - - - - 0.02 
10 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.02 
WP - - - - - - - - - 0.1 - - - - - 0.1 
10 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 0.1 
Abb- abbreviation; PSFs- Performance Shaping factors; HEP-Human Error Probability; Comp-complexity; Exp- experience; Proced- procedures; Ergo-
ergonomic; FfD-fitness for duty;  W.Process- Work Process; Local- location; Dep-dependency; 
 
 
